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ABSTRACT
Confederate Borderland, Indian Homeland:
Slavery, Sovereignty, and Suffering in Indian Territory
Zachery Christian Cowsert
This thesis explores the American Civil War in Indian Territory, focusing on how
clashing visions of sovereignty within the Five Tribes—Cherokee, Chickasaw, Choctaw, Creek,
and Seminole—led to the one the most violent and relatively unknown chapters of the Civil War.
Particular attention is paid to the first two years of the war, highlighting why the Five Tribes
allied with Confederacy, and why those alliances failed over time. Chapter One examines Indian
Territory as a borderland, unveiling how various actors within that borderland, including
missionaries, Indian agents, white neighbors in Arkansas and Texas, and Indians themselves
shaped Native American decision-making and convinced acculturated tribal elites to forge
alliances with the Confederacy. These alliances, however, did not represent the sentiments of
many traditionalist Indians, and anti-Confederate Creeks, Seminoles, and African-Americans
gathered under the leadership of dissident Creek chief Opothleyahola. Cultural divisions within
the Five Tribes, and differing visions of sovereignty in the future, threatened to undermine
Indian-Confederate alliances. Chapter Two investigates the Confederacy’s 1861 winter
campaign designed to quell Opothleyahola’s resistance to Confederate authority. This campaign
targeted enemy soldiers and civilians alike, and following a series of three engagements
Opothleyahola’s forces were decisively defeated in December. During this campaign, however,
schisms with the Confederate Cherokees became apparent. In the weeks that followed,
Confederate forces pursued the men, women, and children of Opothelyahola’s party as they fled
north across the frozen landscape for the relative safety of Kansas. The military campaign
waged in 1861, and the untold suffering heaped upon thousands of civilians that winter, exposes
how a hard, violent war rapidly emerged within the Confederate borderland, complicating
historians’ depiction of a war that instead grew hard over time.
Chapter Three documents the return of Federal forces to the borderland via the First
Indian Expedition of 1862. Although the expedition was a military failure, the sudden presence
of Union forces in the region permanently split the Cherokee tribe into warring factions. The
Cherokee, Creek, and Seminole tribes spent the next three years fighting their own intra-tribal
civil wars. Moreover, the appearance and retreat of Federal forces from Indian Territory created
a geopolitical vacuum, which would be filled by guerrilla violence and banditry. The failure of
either Confederate or Union forces to permanently secure Indian Territory left Indian homelands
ripe for violence and lawlessness. The thesis concludes by evaluating the cost of the conflict.
One-third of the Cherokee Nation perished during the war; nearly one-quarter of the Creek
population died in the conflict. By war’s end, two-thirds of Indian Territory’s 1860 population
had become refugees. Urged to war by outsiders and riven with their own intra-tribal strife,
Native Americans of the Five Tribes suffered immensely during the Civil War, victims of one of
the most violent, lethal, and unknown chapters in American history.
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Introduction
Thousands of Cherokees gathered in the Cherokee capital of Tahlequah in the heart of
Indian Territory to witness the day’s momentous proceedings in the autumn of 1861. On hand
were Confederate General Albert Pike and Superintendent of Indian Affairs Elias Rector; both
men satisfied at the culmination of months of diplomatic wrangling, saber-rattling, and pleading.
These newly-minted Southern leaders had finally convinced the Cherokee Nation to align with
the nascent Confederacy, and today, on September 25, the treaty of alliance would be signed.
The last of the Five Civilized Tribes in Indian Territory—Cherokee, Chickasaw, Choctaw,
Creek, and Seminole—had come into the Confederate fold.1
As two Cherokee leaders signed the treaty, they looked upon one another. On one side
stood John Ross, Principal Chief of the Cherokee Nation and champion of the everyday
Cherokee people. Perhaps for him, at least internally, this day was not one for celebration. Ross
had fought for months to keep the Cherokees out of the looming civil war, to let the tranquility
and peace of neutrality cover the Nation. It was not to be. Ross was here to reluctantly send his
nation to war. Across from John Ross stood Stand Watie, who had sought an alliance with the
South from the very beginning. For Stand Watie, Cherokee interests, especially those of the
elite, acculturated class to which he belonged, were clearly aligned with those of the Southern
states. This September gathering was Watie’s triumphant moment. The Cherokee Nation had
cast its lot with the South and, for the time being at least, its two great leaders stood side by side
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Since civilization is a relative term, the Five “Civilized” Tribes will be referred to as the Five Tribes for
the remainder of this paper. Indian Territory encompasses modern-day Oklahoma, and each of the Five Tribes
would ultimately have bordered nations located in the eastern and central portions of the Territory. To stave off
repetition, the terms Indian, Native American, and native will be used interchangeably.
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under the Stars and Bars. Southern neighbors and newspapers, who had watched intently to see
which way the Indians would go, crowed about the diplomatic victory for weeks to come.2
These two men—John Ross and Stand Watie—embodied the two differing visions of
Indian sovereignty and future that occupied Indian Territory in the crisis months of 1861. These
dueling visions of the future—one of Indians as sovereign members of wider Confederate
society, the other of Indians preserving their traditional way of life under old Federal treaties—
were mutually exclusive, and their exclusivity would lead to profound violence. This story, then,
is how irreconcilable visions of the future generated one of the most-destructive chapters in
American history.
It is not surprising to find that whites were so heavily invested in the Five Tribes’
decision-making process in the crisis moment of 1861. On the verge of the Civil War, Indian
Territory transformed into a borderlands between two continental powers, where vibrant and
sometimes violent exchanges of political, religious, cultural, and ideological ideas between
Native-Americans and their white counterparts took place. As war loomed on the horizon,
Indians were forced to choose sides, and their choices proved of great interest to, and were
heavily influenced by, white missionaries, Indian agents, and neighbors. The external pressure
exerted by whites accentuated pre-existing cultural cleavages among the Five Tribes. Even prior
to their removal in the 1830’s, each of the Five Tribes suffered schisms between those who
wanted to adopt white, Southern lifestyles and those who sought to preserve traditional, native
ways of life. By 1861, acculturated Indian elites controlled native governments, and many of
these elites recognized their precarious geopolitical circumstances and proved receptive to white
Confederates overtures of alliance. Seeing their interests as intertwined with those of the South,
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Dallas Herald, vol. 9, no. 49, September 11, 1861; The [Clarksville] Standard, October 26, 1861.
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Indian elites forged treaties of alliance with the nascent Confederacy, with all Five Tribes in the
Confederate fold by the autumn of 1861.
Yet elites’ visions of themselves as Southerners clashed with the visions of traditional
Indians, who spurned the changes acculturation brought and sought to protect Indian
distinctiveness and sovereignty. Almost before the ink on the various Confederate-Indian
treaties had dried, traditional Indians under the leadership of Creek chief Opothleyahola had
gathered to resist Confederate authority. As traditional Indians flocked to Opothleyahola’s
banner, Confederate military authorities sought to silence this dangerous voice of dissent.
Launching an 1861 winter offensive, Confederates inaugurated a military campaign not only
meant to defeat enemy warriors, but a campaign also designed to drive Unionists civilians out of
the country. The result was a series of three hard-fought battles that culminated in
Opothleyahola’s defeat. Worse still, it sent thousands of Opothleyahola’s civilian followers—
men, women, and children—fleeing northwards across the frozen landscape as refugees. Their
plight, largely forgotten to history, testifies to the perpetration of a type of “hard war” that
historians contend would not arise until late in the war years. Yet in the Confederate
borderlands, clashing Native-American visions of the future and distance from centers of power
allowed brutal violence and civilian suffering to appear in the war’s first months. Moreover, the
1861 campaign against Opothleyahola exposed the fragility of the Confederate-Indian alliances,
foreshadowing great conflict to come.
In 1862, the United States government, a year and a half absent from the political and
military rumblings in Indian Territory, finally returned to the borderlands in the first of two
expeditions that ultimately imposed Union dominance over the region. Although the 1862
expedition fizzled out quickly, the reappearance of U.S. military forces permanently tore asunder
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the schisms between traditional and acculturated Indians that had been simmering. The
Cherokee, Creek, and Seminole tribes split into warring faction, and intra-tribal civil war
devastated these tribes over the war’s remaining years. While the 1862 expedition pushed
Confederate forces out of much of the Territory, the expedition’s ultimate retreat created a
vacuum of power from which a whirlwind of guerrilla violence, banditry, and suffering was
spawned. This endless, localized violence scarred the landscape and its people, impacting
thousands of lives and marking the Confederate borderlands as one of the most war-torn theaters
of the American Civil War and one of the most brutal Indian Wars in American history.
This story of sovereignty, violence, and suffering, is told in three chapters. Chapter One
investigates Native-American decision making during the secession crisis of 1861, detailing how
various members of the borderlands, including Native-Americans themselves, helped forge
treaties of alliance between the Five Tribes and the Confederacy. Relatively few scholars have
examined the wartime decision-making and experiences of the Five Tribes; those that have often
focus on the experiences of a single tribe. A modern, collective exploration of the Five Tribes’
position in the conflict offers greater understanding of the region, and helps illuminate the
interconnectedness of Indian Territory as a borderland. In recent years, historians have grown
wary of the elasticity of the term “borderland,” cautioning that overuse may render the term
meaningless. Acknowledging the legitimacy of this concern, it is important to define precisely
how Indian Territory became a borderland. Even prior to war, Indian Territory marked itself as a
place of great cultural, religious and ideological exchange, where white neighbors, Indian agents,
and missionaries all sought to reshape Native-American ways of life. With the secession of the
Confederate States in 1861, however, Indian Territory transformed from a cultural and
ideological borderland into a very literal political borderland, a place bounded on all sides by
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either the United or Confederate States. And although secession may have added a political
component to the borderlands, those prewar agents of acculturation worked hard to push the Five
Tribes into the Confederate fold, a successful venture that marked the borderland as a
Confederate one.3
Chapter Two illuminates the forgotten 1861 winter campaign against Opothleyahola,
whose followers turned into Unionists as the made their way north across the frozen hills of
northern Indian Territory. This campaign of aggression and terror was waged by both white and
Indian Confederates, and attention is paid to how war made strange bedfellows of white
Southerners and their Indian comrades-in-arms. Most importantly, however, this chapter
documents a Confederate campaign that was vicious both on the battlefield and off. Civilians
found themselves targets of Confederate aggression, both their morale and physical well-being
under attack. Historians of the Civil War cast their eyes across the Mississippi far too little and
pay attention to a military backwater like Indian Territory even less. Yet in this backwater, in
3

There are several works that offer some insight into the experience of Indians during the Civil War.
Lawrence Hauptman’s Between Two Fires: American Indians in the Civil War (1995) offers an episodic overview
of all Native American involvement in the war, not just the Five Tribes in Indian Territory. Indeed, Hauptman
largely focuses on the Delaware tribe’s experience in the Territory during the war. The first work to survey the
conflict in Indian Territory was a trilogy of books by Annie Heloise Abel, notably The American Indian as
Slaveholder and Secessionist (1915) and The American Indian in the Civil War, 1862-1865 (1919). Although nearly
a century old, Abel’s work remains the only piece of scholarship to deeply examine the Five Tribes’ collective
experience during the Civil War. Abel contends that the tribes allied with the Confederacy due to economic and
social ties between the Five Tribes and the South. Since Abel, several authors have explored particular tribal
experiences during the war. Benton and Christine White’s Now the Wolf Has Come: The Creek Nation in the Civil
War tries to uncover the Creek experience in during the early stages of the war. Although useful for understanding
Creek mindset, the Whites’ book often adopts first-person narratives that blur the lines between scholarship and
storytelling. The Cherokee Nation in the Civil War (2007) by Clarissa Confer offers an excellent overview of
Cherokee involvement in the war, paying particular attention to the suffering of civilians. A number of books
examine Indian military units on both sides, most notably Craig Gaines’ The Confederate Cherokee: John Drew’s
Regiment of Mounted Rifles which documents the desertion and defection of many Southern Indians to the Union
cause. The only modern book to examine the Union’s war efforts in the Territory, Mark Lause’s Race and
Radicalism in the Union Army (2009) explains how intellectual radicals and abolitionists in Kansas helped shape
Union drives to reconquer the Territory and utilize Indian soldiers. Most of the secondary Native-American
literature upon which I have drawn are general histories of the various tribes, which often contain a single chapter on
the Civil War years. For more on the various Five Tribes generally, see Grace Steele Woodward’s The Cherokees,
Civilization of the American Indian Series (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1963), Angie Debo, The Rise
and Fall of the Choctaw Republic, Civilization of the American Indian Series (Norman: University of Oklahoma
Press, 1934), Angie Debo, The Road to Disappearance: A History of the Creek Indians (Norman: University of
Oklahoma Press, 1941), and Arrell M. Gibson’s The Chickasaws (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1971).
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the very first year of the war, a violent campaign was waged to drive anti-Confederate Indians
out of the country, including warriors, women, and children. This campaign complicates the
declensionist narrative of war’s violence that historians portray, where 1864 stands as a turning
point for military commanders willing to ratchet up the war’s intensity and target civilian
morale.4
Chapter Three follows the Union army as it returns in 1862 to the borderlands in
abandoned in 1861. Although the campaign was a short-lived military failure, it permanently
divided three of the Five Tribes and ensured that guerrilla violence and banditry would haunt the
land for years. This chapter places Indian Territory alongside better-examined theaters such as
wartime Missouri, Arkansas, and Tennessee—places where constant, localized warfare ruined
the landscape, with civilians once again the victims of violence. The conclusion tallies up the
final cost of this virulent struggle for sovereignty and control, acknowledging the death and
destruction that shattered the Confederate borderland.5

5

In writing this work, I have relied upon a variety of primary sources from a host of (often surprising)
archives and locales. Missionary reports, government documents, soldiers’ letters and service records, Indian
correspondence, 1930’s Federal Writers’ Project oral interviews, the Official Records of the War, Census data,
genealogical research, and more were all critical in uncovering and understanding various aspects of the Civil War
saga in Indian Territory. I have also had the pleasure of traversing some—though not all—of the ground and
geography I discuss, an intangible but immensely useful enterprise. Still, I should point out that certain silences
proved difficult for me to overcome. Overwhelmingly, my sources were Confederate or pro-Southern in their
outlook. To a certain extent, this was beneficial—more often than not, Southerners or pro-Southern Indians are the
most active protagonists in this story. Unfortunately, however, far fewer sources illuminate the experiences and
motivations of Unionist Indians. To a certain extent, I have had to read against the grain, utilizing the contours of
what Confederates did and did not say to understand the shape of Union actions. I have also at times had to rely
upon oral interviews held decades after the events they discussed. While I have tried to exercise the utmost care in
drawing upon these sources, honesty begs me to note their problematic nature.
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Chapter One: Secession and the South
Indian Territory encompassed a web of cultural, religious, economic, ideological, and
political exchanges that marked the area as a southern, and in turn Confederate, borderland.
Indians and their leaders interacted with one another, missionaries, Indian agents, and their
anxious white neighbors in Arkansas and Texas, and these exchanges shaped Native Americans’
diplomatic decision-making in the secession crisis. As the United States broke in two in 1861,
the Five Tribes found themselves caught in the conflict’s whirlwind. Their own internal debates
over what course to pursue—neutrality, continued allegiance to the United States, or a new
beginning with a new Confederacy—were profoundly influenced by these outside actors.
Externally-induced debates over slavery, neighbors’ pleading entreaties and threats of violence,
cajoling Indian agents, and internal Indian cultural and political cleavages shaped Indiandecision making. These diplomatic, political, and cultural exchanges between Indians and
various outsiders helped shape the Five Tribes decision making in 1861. Ultimately, borderland
interactions, hard geopolitical realities, and a belief that Indians’ best interests and brightest
future lay with a Confederacy pushed acculturated elites, and the native governments they
controlled, into alliances with the emerging Confederate States.

As trusted members of both Indian and white societies, missionaries wielded significant
influence among the Five Tribes, focusing on civilizing, proselytizing, and educational goals.
Yet during the 1850’s, a small minority of abolitionist missionaries inserted the slavery question
into Indian affairs, reigniting older cultural and political feuds. Christian missionaries, charged
with civilizing the Five Tribes, instead battled over the what “civilization” meant themselves,
bringing the national debate over slavery into Indian Territory. The result was an increasingly
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fearful political climate, where Indian elites and white neighbors saw abolitionist schemes in
every corner. When the secession crisis emerged in the summer of 1861, the wider cultural and
political schisms that abolitionism helped ignite shaped Indian elites’ decision-making. Invested
in a slaveholding economy and fearful of abolition’s grasp, wealthy Indians sought solidarity—
and alliance—with the South.
Despite their small number, missionaries enjoyed an important, influential place in Indian
society. Although missionary work had begun in the colonial era, it was the Second Great
Awakening that brought increased missionary efforts to Native Americans. Missionaries had
played a prominent role in opposing the fraudulent process of Indian removal the United States
had implemented in the 1820’s and 1830’s. They often worked among a single tribe for much of
their lives, and upon removal, many missionaries followed their flocks to new homes in the
West. Thus, missionaries built rapport and trust with native leaders and communities throughout
the early 19th century.6
In both the old lands and new, missionaries worked to convert Native Americans to both
Christianity and white Americans’ way of life. Missionaries delivered sermons in native
languages, translated hymns and Bible chapters, and established churches, missions, and
Christian organizations. Cyrus Byington’s career is indicative of the kind of work missionaries
performed. Riding a circuit of nearly 100 miles, Byington preached at five different locations
and spent his spare time writing Choctaw-English language books. Stephen Foreman,
missionary among the Cherokees, helped develop the Cherokee Bible Society. Announcements

6

Clarissa Confer, The Cherokee Nation in the Civil War (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2007):
27-2-8. It was a missionary, Reverend Samuel Worcester, who challenged the legality of fraudulent treaty forcing
the Cherokees to move west in the 182 Supreme Court case Worcester v. Georgia. Despite the Supreme Court
siding with Worcester and the Cherokee, the removal continued anyways. Worcester continued his missionary work
in Indian Territory.
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for temperance groups, Bible societies, and fraternal organizations dot antebellum issues of
Territorial newspapers such as the Cherokee Advocate and Choctaw Intelligencer.7
Missionaries also promoted Indian education, helping create public school systems
throughout the Territory and opening schools of their own. By the 1850’s, for example, the
Cherokee, Chickasaw, Choctaw, and Creek Nations all had brick and mortar academies for
promising Indian students. Prominent Indian families also had the chance to send their sons to
schools in the United States, usually in the South. Young George Washington Grayson, a Creek
and future Confederate, studied in a school house “built of stakes driven in the ground and
weather boarded and roofed with clapboards” in 1859. Months later, Grayson found himself on
the campus of Arkansas College in Fayetteville. He wrote of his experience, “I became more
civilized and more careful of my apparel and personal appearance, and thereafter had my
clothing cut and sewed by the city tailor, and in the prevailing style.” Education inculcated
Indians, especially elites, to white ways of life, and for those who studied abroad in the United
States, it often steeped students in Southern lifestyles.8
To be sure, there were limits to missionaries’ progress. The head of a Creek manual
school in 1859 reported exasperatedly, “The people, generally, do not appreciate the importance
of education sufficiently to require their children to attend school….[A]ttendance at the day
schools is very irregular.” Christianity only took shallow root amongst the Five Tribes. While
certainly many Indians were exposed to Christianity, relatively few adopted or practiced it with
any regularity. By 1860, for example, only 12 percent of Cherokees belonged to any Protestant
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Louis Coleman, “Cyrus Byington: Missionary to the Choctaws,” Chronicles of Oklahoma 62, no. 4
(1984): 370-371; for specific examples of Christian advertisements, see Choctaw Intelligencer, October 18, 1851
and Cherokee Advocate, September 26, 1844.
8
Arrell M. Gibson, The Chickasaws (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1971): 202-204; George
Washington Grayson, A Creek Warrior for the Confederacy (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1988): 38,
53.
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denomination. Traditional Indian beliefs continued to abound. Whatever the limitations,
however, the dozens of missionaries among the Five Tribes had proven their influence in shaping
Indian education, salvation, and culture.9
By the 1850’s, however, “civilization” became an increasingly disputed term as certain
missionaries began to preach abolitionist ideals. Abolitionism, as elsewhere in the South, was
unwelcome in a slaveholding society, and chattel slavery was wholly adopted and practiced by
all Five Tribes in the Territory. Slaveholding, especially among the wealthier, acculturated
elites, was not uncommon. Robert M. Jones, a Choctaw and one of the wealthiest figures in
Indian Territory, operated six plantations that produced hundreds of bales of cotton annually.
Such an operation required tremendous amounts of labor, and 227 slaves worked Jones’ fields.
Of course, Jones was an exception—most Indians who owned slaves held five or less. Still,
slavery permeated Indian Territory. The total population of the Territory in 1860 was 58,594:
82 % Indian, 14 % slaves, and 4 % white. Approximately 8,376 blacks were held in bondage by
Indians, mostly the acculturated, wealthy elite.10
These statistics indicate that slavery within Indian Territory more closely resembled
slavery in the border states than that of the Upper or Deep South. Slaves comprised 12.7 percent
of the border states’ population; similarly, slaves constituted 14.2 percent of Indian Territory’s
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Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for the Year 1859 (Washington: George W. Bowman,
1860): 182; William G. McLoughlin, The Cherokees and Christianity, 1794-1870 (Athens: University of Georgia
Press, 1994): 19.
10
Michael L. Bruce, “‘Our Best Men are Fast Leaving Us:’ The Life and Times of Robert M. Jones,”
Chronicles of Oklahoma 66, no. 3 (1988): 294-296; Michael F. Doran, “Negro Slaves of the Five Civilized Tribes,”
Annals of the Association of American Geographers 68, no. 3 (Sept., 1978): 348; Michael F. Doran, “Population
Statistics of Nineteenth-Century Indian Territory,” Chronicles of Oklahoma 53, no. 4 (1975): 501.
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population in 1860. Comparatively, slaves made up 30 percent and 58.5 percent of the
populations of the Upper and Lower South, respectively.11
Years of interaction with whites had ensured that Indian-black relations roughly mirrored
those of white-black relations. All free blacks were expelled from Choctaw lands in 1840. By
1846, manumission of slaves by Choctaw owners could only come with the permission of the
Choctaw General Council. Similarly, during the 1840’s the Cherokee National Council passed a
series of black codes that resembled those of other Southern states. Slave patrols were created.
Blacks were prohibited from carrying weapons or learning to read or write. Masters were held
accountable for their slaves’ actions. Prior to the Civil War, racial views hardened among the
Five Tribes.12
Yet while Indians adopted Southern racial views, missionaries from the North
increasingly advocated abolitionism. At the center of this movement stood Evan Jones and his
son John, Baptist preachers from the North. With the “sincere desire and earnest prayer that
[slavery] may be speedily brought to an end,” the Joneses worked to combat the influence of
slavery in Indian Territory, particularly among the Cherokee.13
As mentioned above, the Cherokee were split into two economic and social factions: the
wealthy, slave-owning, often mixed-blood elite who dominated Cherokee politics and the less
affluent, small-farming, often full-blood traditionalists who comprised a far greater portion of the
Nation but were left largely without economic and political power. These cleavages created
natural fault lines along which the slavery debate grew. In 1855, Cherokee Chief John Ross
11

William W. Freehling, The South vs. The South: How Anti-Confederate Southerners Shaped the Civil
War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001): 18-19. Freehling defines the border states as Missouri,
Kentucky, Maryland, and Delaware.
12
Barbara Krauthamer, Black Slaves, Indian Masters: Slavery, Emancipation, and Citizenship in the
Native American South (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2013): 71; R. Halliburton, Jr., Red Over
Black: Black Slavery among the Cherokee Indians (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1977): 80-84.
13
Patrick Minges, Slavery in the Cherokee Nation: The Keetowah Society and the Defining of a People,
1855-1867 (New York: Routledge, 2003): 66.
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informed the Baptist Joneses of the existence of pro-slavery secret society among the mixedblood Cherokees, an organization with apparent ties to southern states. This pro-slavery “secret
society” would eventually evolve into an Indian chapter of the infamous Knights of the Golden
Circle, dominated largely by wealthy elites. Working with native preachers, the Joneses formed
their own counter-organization, the Keetowah Society. Comprised of traditional, conservative
Indians, the Keetowah practiced a syncretic religion that blended aspects of Christianity,
Cherokee tradition, and brotherhood. Although generally anti-slavery, as scholar William
McLoughlin has deftly argued, the “immediate purpose of the Keetowah Society was to combat
those mixed-bloods who wanted to link the Cherokees’ destiny to that of the white southern
nationalist movement in the United States.” Debates over slavery, fueled by missionaries and
deepened by pre-existing social rifts, were pulling the Cherokee Nation in opposite directions.14
Although precise numbers are not known, it is unlikely the Keetowah Society ever
encompassed more than a sliver of the Cherokee population in antebellum years. Yet despite its
small size, the Keetowah Society and abolitionism in general struck fear into the hearts of
wealthy Indian slaveholders of all Five Tribes and the tribal governments they dominated.
Choctaw George Hawkins was of the “opinion that those stinking abolitionists will yet cause the
Choctaws a great deal of trouble…They are a treacherous hypocritical set of Yankees.” Hawkins
privately wrote that he was “done with missionary schools” and the “influence these missionaries
14

The terms “mixed blood” and “full blood” present difficulties. Although most traditionalist Indians were
indeed “full bloods” and many acculturated Indians were “mixed bloods,” as historians have recently begun to
argue, it was not quantum of blood, mixed or full, that determined Indian politics. In other words, it was resistance
or willingness to adopt to white, Southern culture that defined these groups’ politics, not blood. This also helps
explain how certain figures such as John Ross, of mixed-blood heritage himself, could ultimately prove sympathetic
to traditionalist causes. Still, contemporaries of the time often noted the blood-divide between the traditionalist and
acculturated camps within the tribes. In this work, I have tried to avoid, where possible, using blood as a means of
analysis and have instead focused on the issues of acculturation and in turn, Confederate alliance, that politically
divided these groups. For more on the mixed-blood, full-blood divide as a poor means of analysis, see Theda
Perdue, “Mixed Blood” Indians: Racial Construction in the Early South, Mercer University Lamar Memorial
Lectures No. 42 (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2003); William G. McLoughlin, After the Trail of Tears:
The Cherokees’ Struggle for Sovereignty, 1839-1880 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1993): 154156.
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have over some of our Choctaw people.” J.B. Hancock thought it best to monitor the
missionaries closely, “lest they might incite your slaves to rebellion…and mature their diabolical
plots of treachery.” Slaveholder Robert Jones complained that missionaries too often “preach
abolitionism.” The Choctaw and Chickasaw Indian agent, Douglas Cooper, warned in an 1860
report, “No doubt we have among us free-soilers; perhaps abolitionists in sentiment,” although
Cooper noted that those “who entertain opinions unfriendly to our system of domestic slavery,
carefully keep their opinions to themselves.” Although writing in 1862, Cherokee missionary
Stephen Foreman’s diary conveys the passions the issue stirred amongst the pro-slavery camp.
“I am a Southern man from principle, and have for some years been fighting the principles and
practices of the abolitionist,” Foreman confided to his journal, “and now since I have seen and
felt the workings of abolitionism, I am ten times more opposed to it.” Clearly, slavery and
abolitionism were on the minds of both white and Indian Southerners.15
Adding to the hysteria was the possibility of abolitionist arms-dealing in the Territory.
Missionary George Ainslie confessed that a fellow reverend had been arrested on the charge
“that he was trafficking in arms—which unfortunately was true.” Reverend C.B. Downing wrote
to his superiors in New York that the arrested individual, “by selling revolvers secretly, has been
‘suspected’ of abolitionism.” The panic was spilling over “among our Texas and Arkansas
neighbors,” Downing noted. However small the abolitionists’ number, they were causing quite a
stir and proving additional fuel for anti-abolitionist sentiment. Indeed, so concerned were
Texans that soon armed mobs were striking into Indian Territory in search of abolitionists.
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These actions, in turned, angered the Choctaws, whose sovereignty was violated by these acts of
vigilante justice. The Choctaw reportedly held meetings “to organize and arm in home defense”
in reaction to Texan incursions. The specter of abolitionism frightened Indian elites, worried
fellow missionaries, angered white neighbors, and marred Indian-white relationships.16
Even Chief John Ross, who although a slaveholder was an ally of the traditionalist
faction within the Cherokee tribe, worried about abolitionism. In his 1860 annual message, Ross
lamented that “the subject of slavery has become paramount to all other considerations in
opposite sections of the United States.” Ross warned against agitation against slavery: “we
should discountenance every thing of the sort, and not needlessly and unwisely disturb our own
peace.” The Southern Superintendent of Indian Affairs Elias Rector noted in his 1860 report that
“great strife and contention” was brewing amongst the Cherokee. “Hostile parties have been
organized, and, it is said, an extensive secret association formed among the full-bloods. Murders
are continually committed…” Rector pinpointed the source of the trouble to “be the
intermeddling, by the missionaries among them, headed by Evan and John Jones, with the
institution of slavery.”17
Although John Ross declared that the slavery question was a “settled” one amongst the
Cherokee, the reality was that abolitionism was increasingly a wedge dividing all of the Five
Tribes. As Southern states seceded, Indians elites contemplated their connections with their
Southern brethren, and the shared institution of slavery loomed large. The slaveholding elite
clearly had a vested interest in ensuring that their property remained secure within a Southern
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confederacy. While slaveholders may have represented a small fraction of the Indian population,
they wielded enormous political power. Robert Jones, again utilizing his influence, argued
passionately for secession in front of the Choctaw National Council in 1861. The Chickasaw
Legislature declared that “our geographical position, our social and domestic institutions, our
feelings and sympathies, all attach us to our Southern friends” in its declaration of independence
in May, 1861. Furthermore, the Legislature warned of a war waged by the “Lincoln
Government” that “will surpass the French revolution in scenes of blood and that of San
Domingo in atrocious horrors.” Missionary activity catalyzed the slavery discussion.18
Missionaries were not the only ones charting the course of Indian “civilization.”
Government-appointed Indian agents regularly reported to Washington, D.C. with their analysis
of how the Five Tribes were progressing in Indian Territory. Mostly Southern and
overwhelmingly pro-slavery in outlook, they worked tirelessly to bring the Five Tribes into the
Confederate fold. In 1861, all five of the federally appointed Indian agents to the Five Tribes
sided with the secession movement and urged the Indian tribes to ally with the Confederacy.
The Creek Indian agent, South Carolinian William H. Garrett, was a trusted figure among
the tribe and helped pull the tribe into the war on behalf of the South. During his tenure, Garrett
involved himself in the discussion about the efficiency of the Creek government. The Creeks,
unlike several of the other Five Tribes, did not have a constitutionally constructed government.
Garrett felt that the Creeks’ “primitive form of government” suited them well, however, and felt
that “education and association with the white man…will prepare them, at no very distant day,
18
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for a more complicated form of government.” The Creek Nation, located in the heart of Indian
Territory, was also home to the Seminoles, who had been the last of the Five Tribes to arrive in
the Territory. The Creeks and Seminoles clashed politically and socially with one another,
largely over allegations of Seminole importation of liquor. Garrett recommended and oversaw
the process of separation between the two tribes that resulted in the formation of the Seminole
Nation (just west of the Creek Nation) in 1856. With the outbreak of secession and war in 1861,
Garrett pushed the Creeks to ally with the Confederacy. When the Creeks did form such an
alliance on July 10, Garrett even played a role in the formation of a Creek regiment of warriors
for Confederate service, angling in part to lead the troops himself (he was denied the position).
He would go on to serve in the Confederate army.19
The Seminoles’ Indian agents proved influential among the tribe, helping convince the
Seminoles that economic and social ties bound the tribe to the Southern cause. Josiah
Washburne served as the Seminole Indian agent from 1853-57 and remained active among the
Seminoles after that time. His replacement, Virginian Samuel Rutherford, saw the Seminole
Nation through the secession crisis of 1861. Both men were ardent secessionists and worked to
bring the Seminole into the Confederate fold. Washburne had played a crucial role in securing
the Seminoles status as an independent nation and was well-respected among the Seminole
community. Although a Northerner by birth, Union agents believed that he was one of the most
rabid secessionists in the Territory. As the Seminole Nation did not border Arkansas or Texas,
Washburne was one of the few influential whites in the area pushing for secession. Washburne
argued that the crumbling United States would be unable to pay the Seminoles their annual
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annuities and that the Confederacy, sure to have European support in its bid for independence,
could guarantee the nation’s political security. For his Southern loyalties, Washburne was
recommended for a quartermaster command in a Confederate Indian regiment. Samuel
Rutherford also supported secession, but instead focused on the shared institution of slavery and
geographic links Indians had with the South. Never bothering to formally resign his U.S. post,
he earned himself a recommendation as the Confederate Seminole Indian agent.20
The Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations shared an agent in Douglas H. Cooper, who had
warned of “free-soilers” amongst these tribes in 1860. Cooper, a Mississippian who had served
as an agent since 1853, was a strong supporter of both slavery and the Confederacy and quickly
rallied to the Southern cause. In May 1861, the Confederate Secretary of War Leroy Walker
wrote to Cooper requesting that he “cultivate the most friendly relations and the closest alliance
with the Choctaw Nation and all the Indian tribes” in the Territory. Walker pointed out the
“unjust designs against the Indian country the Northern movement” had perpetrated. The Five
Tribes “destiny has thus become our own,” Walker determined. While the sweeping claims of
Walker can be questioned, Walker did authorize Cooper to raise a regiment for Confederate
service among the Choctaw and Chickasaw. Cooper commanded the 1st Choctaw and
Chickasaw Mounted Rifles for much of the war (the only non-Indian to command an Indian
regiment) and eventually earned his brigadier general’s stars serving the Confederacy. 21
The Cherokees’ Indian agent held the least sway among any tribal agent, fighting, as he
was, the relative strength of the Cherokee tribe, the determined neutrality of John Ross, and
reluctance of many traditional Indians to rush into a Southern alliance. The Cherokee Indian
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agent at the time of secession, John Crawford, was an Arkansan hailing from Fayetteville.
Crawford had voted against Lincoln in the 1860 election, and he supported the emergent
Confederacy. Crawford threw his support behind Stand Watie and other elite Cherokees who
supported secession. Yet Watie was not chief of the Cherokee; that position was held by John
Ross, who remained determined throughout the summer of 1861 to keep his nation neutral.
Thus, while the four tribes were allying with the South, the Cherokee maintained a position of
neutrality until August. Crawford would continue to remain the Cherokee Indian agent under
Confederate authorities.22
Taken collectively, the Indian agents to the Five Tribes, largely hailing from the South
and decidedly pro-Southern in sentiment, played a role in convincing Indian elites of the wisdom
of a Confederate alliance. Indian agents, especially those with long tenure such as Douglas
Cooper and Josiah Washburne, were well-known, trusted, and respected figures amongst their
respective Indian communities. In Seminole and Creek tribes, the Indian agents played a more
decisive role in forging Indian-Confederate alliances, overcoming significant numbers of proneutral Indians among these tribes. Indian agents were cultural middlemen, schooled in both
white and native culture, politics, and society. These agents utilized their positions in the
summer of 1861 as platforms to push a pro-Confederate agenda, often emphasizing shared
borders, similar social institutions including slavery, economic realities, and the inevitability of
Southern independence to convince Indian elites and tribal governments that, as Secretary of
War stated, the Five Tribes’ “destiny has thus become our own.”
Southerners did not need to have a federally-appointed post to interact with the Five
Tribes or persuade Native-Americans why allying with the South was in their best interest. The
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Five Tribes had white Southern neighbors in both Arkansas and Texas with whom they had
longstanding relationships. These relationships transformed into conduits for political and
ideological exchanges in the crisis of 1861, channels by which Indian and Southern ties could be
strengthened.
Indian Territory was closely linked economically and, to a lesser extent politically, to
Arkansas and Texas. It is worth noting that while only 4% of the Indian Territory’s population
was white, that white population was overwhelmingly Southern (75%), with the largest
contingent hailing from the Upper South. Of course, this makes sense geographically, especially
when one considers that Indian Territory lay along several important routes for Southwestern
emigration. Moreover, while missionaries may have exerted some influence, especially in
regards to the slavery question, they were relatively few in number. As scholars have pointed
out, most Indian interaction and acculturation occurred with everyday white Southerners. 23
Two vital arteries connected the Indian Territory to its neighbors—the Arkansas and Red
River Valleys. The Arkansas River connected Cherokee Nation to Fort Smith, Little Rock, and
the Mississippi River. The Red River, running along the Texas-Indian Territory border, was
perhaps the more vital artery of the two as it cascaded down through Louisiana to New Orleans
and the Gulf of Mexico. The Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations, located in southern Indian
Territory and bordering Texas and the Red River, benefited most from the river trade.
Copies of the Choctaw Intelligencer from the 1850’s bear witness to the extensive trade
plied all along the Red. Advertisements hawked dry goods, groceries, books, stationary, boots,
saddles, medicine and more. Virtually all of the advertisements represented warehouses and
stores along the Red River, in Shreveport and New Orleans. The Cherokee Advocate promoted
goods in Van Buren, Cane Hill, and other towns in Arkansas near the Territory border. Not just
23
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goods traversed the waterways and roads of the region, of course. News certainly did as well.
The Cherokee Advocate, somewhat more urbane than the Intelligencer, featured the latest from
papers and journals such as the Chambers Edinburg Journal, Philadelphia Inquirer, and the
Annals of Education. Local news and announcements, such as dates for temperance society
meetings or the funeral of a Freemason, were sure to be found. Yet editorials as well as national
and international news also appeared in print. The Saturday, November 9, 1844 edition of the
Advocate, for example, contained not just local news, but the latest from the Republic of Texas,
Siberia, and Morocco. The contents of these papers, both news and advertisements, reveal both
local and long-distance networks of economic, informational, and ideological exchange.24
Neighbors, of course, knew one another more intimately. Whites and Indians
intermarried, despite attempts to regulate such behavior. In 1855, the Cherokee Nation passed a
law regulating marriage between Cherokee women and white men. Concerned with white men
gaining access to the abundant resources of the Territory, white men needed governmental
permission to marry Cherokee women. Still, intermarriage between whites and Indians occurred,
and families had kin on the other side of the border.25
As Southern states began to secede, Arkansans and Texans cast a keen eye over Indian
Territory, wondering what course their Indian neighbors would pursue. It was an important
question, for Indian Territory served as a buffer region, lodged on Arkansas’ western flank and
shielding North Texas from jayhawker Kansas. Future Confederate Commissioner of Indian
Affairs David Hubbard, sent as a secessionist commissioner to Arkansas in January 1861, noted
some Arkansans’ anxiety regarding secession without an understanding that the Five Tribes
would move in a congruent fashion. The Arkansas state government was unwilling to secede as
24
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“the people have not yet made up their minds to go out.” “The [Arkansas] counties bordering on
the Indian Nations, Creeks, Cherokees, Choctaws and Chicasaws [sic],” Hubbard reported,
“would hesitate greatly to vote for secession, and leave those Tribes still under the influence of
the Government at Washington, from which they receive large stipends and annuities.” Hubbard
recognized the importance of Indian Territory: “These Indians are at a spot very important, in
my opinion, in this great sectional controversy, and must be assured that the South will do as
well as the North, before they could be induced to change their allegiance and dependence.” The
geopolitical importance of Indian Territory, and the allegiance of its denizens, was not lost on
Arkansas.26
Texans, and especially the citizens of North Texas settlements, watched their Native
American neighbors to the north (especially those in the bordering Choctaw and Chickasaw
Nations) intently and proved more proactive in affairs in Indian Territory. The counties of northcentral Texas constituted a small pocket of Unionism amidst a sea of secession in 1861. In
Texas’ February, 1861 referendum, eight north Texas counties had voted to remain in the Union.
North Texas had relatively little to gain from secession. Many farmers relied upon sales of
wheat and corn to government agencies in Indian Territory, and just like their fellow Arkansans,
North Texans worried about the proximity of Indians and possible Federal invasion across the
border.
As has already been mentioned, Texan mobs proved themselves willing to violate Indian
sovereignty in search of abolitionists. Reverend John Edward’s experience with these marauding
26
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mobs is perhaps representative. He reported that a “company of Texans” arrived at his home “to
search for revolvers.” The Texans not finding any (for Edwards had none), then wanted to know
“if Edwards was with the South” and should war erupt, if he “would take up arms for the South.”
Unable to “pledge myself to that,” Edwards left the Territory as soon as possible. In this
instance, Texans used searching for weapons as a pretense to remove any Territorial residents
who did not possess pro-Southern sentiments.27
In April 1861, Texans increased their pressure on the Territory by seizing abandoned
U.S. army forts in the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations. These violations of Indian sovereignty
and the close proximity of armed Texans made some Indians uneasy. Choctaw Sampson Folsom
wrote in May that he found “our lovely country in the hands of Texanian [sic] filibusters. They
are making inroads upon our soil…making war upon the old missionaries of the Country.”
Folsom felt confident that the Texans had an ulterior motive. “What they will do next,” he
determined, “is make white settlement our midst.” Folsom had a radical solution: “I am for
raising five thousand Choctaws and Chickasaw troops at once to keep out Land Pirates and
abolitionists.” Texans were securing their interests by force, and it threatened Indian-white
harmony.28
Yet the Texans’ forceful tactics, however offensive to some, worked. As the secession
crisis grew, the proximity and pressure of Texans pushed the Chickasaw Nation to make their
decision, and the Nation allied with the South on May 25. The Choctaw Nation, however,
grappled with the issue longer. Peter Pitchlynn, a highly influential member of the Choctaw
elite, favored neutrality. As a mid-June meeting of the Choctaw Council loomed, Pitchlynn
attempted to convince the Choctaw Principal Chief George Hudson that neutrality was the best
27
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option. Hudson seemingly agreed. For Texans, the possibility of Choctaw neutrality was
unacceptable. A Texan vigilance committee crossed into Choctaw Nation, surrounded
Pitchlynn’s home and damned him as an abolitionist. Threats were made on Pitchlynn’s safety
should he persist in his neutral stance. When the Choctaw Council finally met, it was “full of
white men” from Texas, who met privately with Choctaw elites to ensure that secession
followed. As the meeting began, Robert M. Jones spoke first, proclaiming that any who opposed
secession ought to be hanged. With approving Texans looking on, George Hudson was
thoroughly cowed, and the Choctaw Nation seceded. 29
It is doubtful secession reflected the opinions of all, if even a majority, of the Choctaw
people. Reverend Copeland opined of that the “Choctaws & Chickasaws are trying to be quiet
and take no part or lot in the strife” and that “some [are] wishing to secede, but the majority
opposed to secession for the present.” Another missionary, Orlando Lee, reported much
reluctance among the Choctaw regarding secession. He wrote that some Choctaws told him, “If
the north was here so we could be protected we would stand up for the north but now if we do
not go in for the south the Texans will come over here and kill us.” Furthermore, Lee indicated
that traditionalist Indians “were strongly for the north,” but eventually “yielded to the pressure”
and joined the pro-Southern ranks. 30
Certainly, there were many Choctaws who were loyal to the South and viewed
southerners and Texans as their brethren. At an assembly of Choctaw warriors on July 4, 1861,
an old warrior delivered a speech under a Confederate flag. The Standard, published in
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Clarksville, Texas, carried the report. “Warriors of the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations!” the
old Indian began. “Who are these men? Your brothers—the men of the South—men who have
come from the land of sunshine across Red River—whose star is in the centre [sic] of your flag,
and who are in our hearts.” The warrior called upon the Indians to fight like Texans: “You, men
and warriors, must emulate their glorious deeds.” These words were met with “deafening shouts
from the warriors.”31
Over a month later, a Texas artillery soldier wrote the Dallas Herald of his experience
marching through Indian Territory. “We made a rapid march through the Chickasaw and
Choctaw nations, and found them both loyal to the South…[W]e came up with regiment of
Indians, who seemed keen for a fight with the Abolitionists.” The soldier continued, “I asked an
Indian warrior who could speak but little English, ‘of what tribes the regiment was composed’”
and was told initially told “‘Choctaw, Chickasaw and white men.’” However another Indian
made an alteration, declaring “‘Oh no, Choctaw, Chickasaw and Texan!’” The soldier wrote, “I
cite this as an incident illustrating how thoroughly these Indians have identified themselves with
the South, and especially with the people of Texas.” In a similar incident, as the Third Texas
Cavalry passed through Boggy Depot, Choctaw Nation that July, local Choctaw ladies presented
them with a flag.32
It is difficult to assess the true sentiments of the Choctaw Nation. While many Choctaw
supported the Confederacy and served in its ranks, there was clearly a minority, perhaps even a
silent majority, who supported a neutral or pro-Union stance. Either way, the historical silence
of whatever pro-neutral Choctaw camp existed is due to the work of Texans, who used threats of
violence and sheer peer pressure to ensure that no serious debate over secession occurred. Texan
31
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citizens were not just mindful of events in Indian Territory, but were proactive in shaping those
events.
What encouraged Texans to resort to force? While the Five Tribes in the Territory may
have enjoyed harmonious relations with their Texan neighbors, other Indian tribes did not. The
nomadic Plains Indians, particularly the Comanche, did not respect Confederate authority and
raided the Texan frontier both before and during the Civil War. Thus, frontier Texans had
constant experience with Indian violence; perhaps looming war blurred the distinctions between
“civilized” and “savage” Indians.
Adding to the traditional fear of Indian raids, the summer of 1860 brought fears of a slave
insurrection. While the details remain uncertain, scholars have concluded that slaves, perhaps
aided by abolitionists, committed serious acts of arson in a variety of Texan towns, destroying
over one million dollars in property. The plot brought attention to abolitionist activities, which
in turn drew eyes north of the border. The Daily Crescent reported that once the plot rendered
the region “helpless,” insurrectionists would receive aid “from the Indians and Abolitionist.”
Ultimately, there is no evidence to suggest any Indian participation in the plot, and few papers
charged Indians of involvement. Yet undoubtedly the plot had Texans on edge. It is
unsurprising, then, that Texan mobs would soon roam Indian Territory in search of abolitionists.
Threatening raids from the Plains tribes and the fear of slave insurrections helped spur Texans to
take matters into their own hands when yet another crisis—this time in the form of Indian
secession—arose in 1861.33
Other citizens took a less brash approach of bringing Native Americans into the
Confederate fold. The fate of the Cherokee Nation, one of the more powerful of the Five Tribes,

33

William W. White, “The Texas Slave Insurrection of 1860,” The Southwestern Historical Quarterly 52,
no. 3 (Jan., 1949): 260, 262, 285.

25

drew the attention of many. Chief John Ross, who led the Cherokee into a position of neutrality
early in 1861, constantly fielded letters from white neighbors both requesting and demanding to
know his intentions. In January 1861, Arkansas Governor Henry Rector wrote John Ross to
inform him that “the incoming administration of Mr. Lincoln” saw Indian Territory as “fruitful
fields, ripe for the harvest of abolitionists, freesoilers, and Northern mountebanks.” Rector
assumed the Cherokees’ course of action, noting that, “We hope to find in your people friends
willing to co-operate with the South in defense of her institutions, her honor, and her firesides.”
Ross responded deftly, pointing out both Cherokee treaties with the United States and that
Cherokee “institutions, locality & natural sympathies are unequivocally with the slave holding
States.” A clever non-answer, Ross never committed to any Southern alliance.34
More letters poured in. In May, citizens of Boonsboro, Arkansas wrote Ross to learn of
Cherokee intentions, noting they preferred “an open enemy to a doubtful friend.” Ross replied
with his “friendship for the People of Arkansas” but noted that “if my present position does not
constitute us ‘as active friends,’ as you might desire us to be, you will surely not regard us as an
enemy.” Again, Ross took a position of “strict neutrality.” Thus, from both the Governor and
everyday citizens, Arkansans sought to uncover the intentions of their Cherokee neighbors,
hoping to convince John Ross of the wisdom of an alliance.35
Confederate General Benjamin McCulloch, tasked with defending Indian Territory, took
a different approach while writing to Ross in June. Professing that Cherokee neutrality “will not
be molested without good cause,” McCulloch then requested that pro-Confederate Cherokees be
allowed to “organize into military companies,” ostensibly for protection from Northern invasion.
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John Ross understood that arming Confederate Cherokees would undercut any claims to
Cherokee neutrality. Ross answered resoundingly. “We have done nothing to bring about the
conflict in which you are engaged with your own people, and I am unwilling that my people shall
become its victims.” Regarding arming Cherokees as home guards, Ross “most respectfully
declined.” No neighbor, whether government official, civilian, or general, could budge Ross on
his position of neutrality.36
White neighbors of Indian Territory both anxiously watched and participated in the
Indian decision-making process in the summer of 1861. Arkansans worried over their western
frontier and thought about the ramifications of secession without Indian allies. Texans proved
more forceful, unafraid of using threats of violence in the process; they ensured that their
neighbors to the north would ally with the South. Yet despite the outpouring of letters from all
rungs of society asking the Cherokee to join with the Confederacy, John Ross remained firm in
neutrality. If white pressure couldn’t budge Ross politically, however, Indian pressure could.
Throughout 1861, while missionaries stirred up fears of abolitionism, Indian agents switched
sides, and neighbors pressured neighbors, Indians had their own internal discussions about which
course to pursue. Geopolitical realities, old political and cultural cleavages within Indian
society, and competing visions of the future all had to be confronted by each of the Five Tribes.
The United States military’s evacuation of Indian Territory in the spring of 1861
profoundly shaped Native American decision making in the subsequent months. While pressure
poured in from all sides for the Five Tribes to ally with the South, the U.S. government and its
military were absent and silent. Grappling with greater crises around the country, the United
States violated its treaty obligations and left Indian Territory both unprotected and vulnerable to
Confederate advances. Diplomatically, there was no counter-weight to Confederate influence.
36
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As the Choctaws had said, “If the north was here so we could be protected we would stand up for
the north.” But the North was not there, and the young Confederacy worked hard to fill the
power vacuum left behind by the retreating United States. Undoubtedly, that decision to retreat
loomed large in the minds of Indian leaders and citizens alike.37
Moreover, Indian Territory was strategically placed between Texas and Arkansas.
Especially for the Chickasaw and Choctaw, continued allegiance to the United States or
neutrality must have seemed futile and possibly dangerous, with Confederate authority so close.
To a certain extent, a domino effect began to occur. First the Chickasaw, then, albeit with a
Texan push, the Choctaw allied with the Confederacy. Suddenly, the Confederate borders with
the Cherokee, Creek and Seminole Nations grew. Forts in southern Indian Territory were now
held by Confederate Texan troops. E.H. Carruth reported that Chief John Jumper of the
Seminoles was torn by the circumstances around him. “He felt true to the [U.S.-Seminole]
treaties, & said that all his people were with the Government,” Carruth reported, “but, the Forts
west were in possession of its enemies, their Agent would give them no information on the
subject, & he feared that his country would be overrun, if he did not yield.” For John Jumper
and the Seminoles, the Confederates were knocking on the door, and the United States was
nowhere to be found. It is no wonder that they allied with the Confederacy.38
The United States’ departure in 1861, and the subsequent advance of the Confederacy,
highlight the how the war had shattered the relative stability of the Indians’ homeland and
transformed it into a tumultuous borderland. Prior to 1861, Indian Territory served as the new
home for the Five Tribes, a place where they could attempt to rebuild their world in a western
locale. While western Plains Indians and political feuds occasionally jarred the political
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landscape, by and large these Indians enjoyed a relative degree of sovereignty and security under
the protection of the United States, who occupied a variety of military posts in the region.
Secession and U.S. retreat turned that frontier into, in effect, a vacuous borderland where chaos,
fear, insecurity, and violence began to reshape the region’s allegiance and, in turn, its future.
By the beginning of August, the option of neutrality was fast dwindling; only two neutral
parties remained. One was the Cherokee Nation led by John Ross. The other was a growing
band of neutral, pro-Union, and anti-Confederate dissidents led by several Creek chiefs, notably
Oktarharsars Harjo (known to whites as Sands) and Opothleyahola. The Creeks had long been
riven into two wings: a traditionalist faction, among whom Sands and Opothleyahola were
leaders, and the acculturated elites headed by brothers Chilly and Daniel McIntosh. The
McIntoshes spearheaded the successful effort to forge a Creek-Confederate alliance, and the
traditionalist Creeks spurned the arrangement. On August 5, a body of full-blood Creeks loyal to
the United States met and declared their Nation’s treaty with the Confederacy illegal and asked
President Lincoln for protection. Communication with Washington was a nightmare; again,
agents of the United States were not on hand for advice or assistance. In November, a delegation
of chiefs went to Kansas, where they discovered new U.S. Indian agents had been appointed to
treat with them. Sands was able to convey that twenty-seven towns and 3,350 warriors remained
loyal to the Union. Unable to provide any meaningful assistance, Federal officials in Kansas
sent the delegation to Washington, D.C. to view the fortifications around the capital and meet
with President Lincoln. It was an empty gesture that gave no meaningful support to loyal
Indians in Indian Territory. 39
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While Unionist Creeks and other dissidents gathered under Opothleyahola along the
North Fork River, John Ross confronted the increasing tenuous diplomatic and political situation
the Cherokee Nation faced. He owed most of his troubles to the machinations of Stand Watie.
Watie and Ross were old rivals, part of a feud dating back to Cherokee removal in the 1830’s.
Watie had belonged to the so-called Treaty Party, which had signed the Treaty of New Echota in
1834. A fraudulent document, it had allowed a small minority of elite Cherokees to sign away
all Cherokee-held lands in the East. The general meeting which approved the treaty had been
attended by roughly 2% of the Cherokee population. John Ross, chief of the Cherokees then as
well, fought and failed to have the treaty overturned, and it was passed through the United States
Congress by a single vote. The resulting Trail of Tears not only ripped the Cherokees from their
ancestral homelands, but also tore apart their society into two warring factions. Leaders of the
Treaty Party were assassinated, and murder became commonplace in the Cherokees’ newfound
land in the West. Only a peace agreement in 1846 kept the Cherokee from breaking into open
civil war.40
Stand Watie and John Ross were authors of that feud. Moreover, each represented
disparate wings of the Cherokee Nation: Watie symbolized the wealthy, acculturated elite who
envisioned themselves as Southerners; Ross was the champion of the poor, traditional Cherokee
masses. Watie and his party, then, had little use for Ross’ declarations of neutrality. At the same
time that Ross was convincing Southern neighbors of the Cherokees’ neutrality, Watie
communicated with various Confederate officials about arming his party for Confederate service.
Letters from citizens in Fayetteville, Arkansas, promised Watie weapons and inquired into his
“feelings and intentions in the present state of war.” In mid-July, Confederate General Benjamin
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McCulloch commissioned Watie a colonel in the Confederate army. Watie soon had a force of
three hundred armed men under his command.41
In August, Stand Watie’s close friend and fellow Treaty Party member William Adair
wrote Watie, asking that he meet with Confederate General Albert Pike so that, “we may have
justice done us, have this pin party [a reference to the Keetowah Society] broken up, and our
rights, provided for and place us if possible at last on an honorable equity with this old Dominant
party [Ross’ Party] that has for years had its foot upon our necks.”42 Watie and his followers
were armed, working with the Confederate military, and undercutting Ross’ neutrality.
John Ross, aware of Watie’s maneuvering, also had to take stock of military matters in
the borderlands. General McCulloch, unable to persuade Ross to join the Confederacy, was
taking matters into his own hands. Earlier in the summer, McCulloch petitioned the Confederate
government for permission to invade Kansas, a move that McCulloch felt was the “only way to
force his [Ross’] country into the Confederacy.” His request was granted, giving him freedom to
strike into Kansas or Missouri as he saw fit, setting the stage for conflict. On August 10,
Confederate forces under General McCulloch and Missouri General Sterling Price decisively
defeated Union troops at the Battle of Wilson’s Creek in southwest Missouri. Fighting alongside
the Southerners were small band of Cherokee “half-breeds;” undoubtedly some of Watie’s men,
although Watie himself was not present. This Southern victory, paired with news of Federal
defeat at Bull Run outside of Washington, D.C., weighed on Ross’ mind.43
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Other tribes’ alliances with the South, Stand Watie’s intransigent refusal to respect
neutrality, and Confederate victories at Wilson’s Creek and Bull Run finally convinced Chief
John Ross that the Cherokees’ fortunes lie with the South. Ross proved himself incredibly
resilient to outside pressure; only glaring geopolitical realities and the desire for Indian unity in
the Territory changed Ross’ thinking. In an address to some four thousand Cherokees on August
21, Ross reminded the Cherokees that Indian Territory was their home. “When your nationality
ceases here,” Ross declared, “it will live nowhere else. When these homes are lost, you will find
no others like them.” Ross acknowledged the seeming reality of the current state of affairs.
“The permanent disruption of the United States into two governments is now probable. The
State [Arkansas] on our border and the Indian Nations about us have severed their connection
from the United States and joined the Confederate States. Our general interest is inseparable
from theirs and it is not desirable that we should stand alone.” Having outlined the situation,
Ross took the final step and asked the people to “signify your consent…for an alliance with the
Confederate States.” That alliance was formalized a little over a month later in Tahlequah, when
Ross and Watie shook hands.44
With John Ross and the Cherokees in the Confederate fold along with the rest of the Five
Tribes, Ross worked to bring Opothleyahola, Sands, and the wayward neutral Creeks into
Confederate alignment as well. When John Ross informed the loyal Creeks on August 24 of the
Cherokees’ alliance with the Confederacy, Opothleyahola and Sands didn’t believe the author of
the letter was Ross. Assurances came from Ross the he was indeed the author, and he stated his
desire “for all the red Brethren to be united” in alliance with the Confederacy. Despite Ross’
attempts, Opothleyahola and his followers, growing by the day, remained loyal to the Union. 45
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By September 1861, the Cherokees, Creeks, Choctaws, Chickasaws, and Seminoles had
all broken their ties with the United States and formed alliances with the Confederacy. These
alliances were the products of diplomatic, political, and cultural exchanges that took place
throughout Indian Territory and with its neighbors in 1861. Abolitionist missionaries sparked
internal rifts among the Cherokee by helping establish the Keetowah Society, which in turn
sparked a much larger fear of abolitionism throughout the region. Fueling fears of abolitionism
were Indian agents, who urged the Five Tribes to follow the South down the road of secession.
White neighbors in Arkansas and Texas also worked to sway the Five Tribes politically.
Arkansans worried, and asked, what course their Indian neighbors would pursue. Texans,
determined to secure their own borders, violated the borders of others. They arrested suspected
abolitionists, pushed out missionaries who did not display pro-Southern sentiments, seized
abandoned U.S. forts in Indian Territory, and used the threat of violence to silence dissent within
the Choctaw Nation. The complete absence of the United State authority offered NativeAmericans no real alternative to Confederate alliances or attempts at neutrality. One by one,
elite-controlled governments of the Five Tribes succumbed to pressure, recognized geopolitical
realities, and allied with the emerging Confederacy. Not even stubborn John Ross could deny
that the Five Tribes’ fate was aligned with the South.
Yet cracks in these Indian-Confederate alliances existed from the very beginning. While
borderland exchanges may have convinced Indians elites that their interests were intertwined
with those of the South, traditionalist Indians remained unconvinced. Indeed, the very need for
external pressure—from missionaries, Indian agents, or neighbors—underscores the lack of
conviction among many Indians regarding the wisdom of joining the Confederacy. The
Cherokee Keetowah Society resisted elite domination and served as a tool for pro-Union and
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abolitionist sentiments. Neutral and pro-Union sentiments among the Choctaw were crushed by
Texan threats. Any thoughts of continued loyalty among the Chickasaw and Seminole were
undermined by the proximity of Texan troops. For leaders like Cherokee John Ross, Choctaw
Peter Pitchlynn, and Seminole John Jumper, alliance with the Confederacy became the only
option, however more alluring neutrality seemed. Convincing and coercing was needed to forge
alliances on paper, but these alliances did not always seep down to the hearts and minds of
traditionalist majorities of the Five Tribes. It is quite possible that a majority of Indians did not,
in fact, support secession and alliance with the South, although gaps in the historical record will
leave that question unanswered.
Perhaps most indicative of the weakness of the Indian-Confederate alliances were the
thousands of followers who gathered under Opothleyahola’s leadership in the fall of 1861.
Estimates range regarding the size of Opothleyahola’s band; some figures place the number as
high as 10,000, although a more reasonable estimate is approximately 5,000. At least 1,500 of
this number were warriors; several hundred of these warriors were blacks, both free and
enslaved. While Creeks and Seminoles comprised the bulk of the party, members of other tribes
could be found as well. If estimates are correct, than nearly 9% of the Indian Territory’s
population had voted with their feet, spurning Southern alliances and leaving their homes to join
Opothleyahola in his stand for neutrality. Opothleyahola’s band was not abolitionist; in fact,
Opothleyahola was one of the largest slaveholders in Creek Nation. Instead, these Indians
rejected the premise that Indian and Confederate interests were intertwined, and they sought
neutrality in the coming conflict. Southern cajoling and coercion failed to convert these Indians,
mostly traditionalists, to the Confederate cause. Unwilling to be silenced, Opothleyahola and his
followers were a nucleus of anti-Confederate dissent, a crack in the foundation that would only
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grow with the fires of war. By 1862, defection and desertion would decimate the ranks of
Confederate Indians, a further indication that pro-Confederate feelings were not heartfelt.46
In some respects, Indian reticence to join the Confederacy mirrors that of the other border
states—Missouri, Kentucky, Maryland, and Delaware—that grappled with secession and civil
war in summer of 1861. As William Harris has noted, border state residents often enjoyed links
to both the north and south that left them in a difficult position upon the onset of hostilities.
Proximity to major urban centers, diverse populations, and fear of their homelands turning into
battlegrounds encouraged some to remain loyal to the Federal government. The institution of
slavery, hostility to abolitionism, and cultural ties bonded border residents to the South. Native
Americans shared many of these sentiments. Many Indians’ desire for neutrality is indicative of
fear over the devastation that war would bring. Indian Territory, of course, also enjoyed a
diverse population, not only in the presence of three different races and a multitude of Indian
tribes, but also in the traditionalist and acculturated factions that divided every tribe. This
population diversity would make it difficult for the Confederacy to unite all Indians under the
Southern banner. Slavery, although entrenched among the Five Tribes, remained limited, with
slaves comprising a small portion of the population (14%) similar to that of Southern border
states, rather than the Upper or Deep South. Still, the Five Tribes clearly were integrated into a
borderland that was Southern in nature. It was with Texas, Arkansas, and Louisiana, not Kansas
or Missouri, that Indians traded for goods, exchanged news, and shared similar institutions,
particularly slavery.47
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If the Five Tribes shared these northern and southern links with their fellow border states,
then clearly the Territory had its own peculiarities and distinctions. The most obvious, of course,
is that unlike Kentucky, Missouri, Maryland, and Delaware, the Five Tribes ultimately did cast
their lot with the Confederacy. As has been shown, this was largely the result of immense
borderlands pressure and a one-sided geopolitical situation that favored the Confederacy. Most
importantly, wealthy, acculturated, slaveholding Indian elites saw their own interests as
intertwined with the Confederacy. It was this pressure that pushed Indian Territory—despite its
similarity to the Border South—into a Confederate alliance. Yet this border state comparison
also helps explain why so many Indians’ loyalty to the South would prove dubious at best. As
historian William Freehling has argued, the Southern border states contributed relatively little to
the Confederate cause, which “seriously compromised Confederate military manpower.”
Despite border state whites constituting 37 percent of the South’s population, only 10 percent of
these whites would serve in Confederate uniform. Moreover, border state whites enlisted in the
Union army at a rate of 2-to-1 over the Confederate army. Despite their Southern links, border
states by and large proved unwilling to cast their lot with the South. And while political
machinations, external pressure, and internal elites may have led Indian Territory into the
Confederacy, the persistent desire of neutrality and the sizeable anti-Confederate gathering under
Opothleyahola all suggest that the anti-Confederate strains found in other border states also
existed within the Five Tribes of Indian Territory.48
Ultimately, borderlands interactions profoundly shaped the way mixed-blood, elites
viewed the looming Civil War. Feeling pressure from all sides, one-by-one these elites led the
Five Tribes’ governments out of the Union and into alliances with the Confederate States. Much
of the responsibility for that decision rested not only among Indian elites themselves, but also
48
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among the missionaries, Indian agents, and Arkansan and Texan neighbors who worked
tirelessly to ensure that the Five Tribes’ future was intertwined with that of the nascent
Confederacy. While these political and cultural exchanges shaped Native-American elites,
however, they were far less persuasive to full-blood traditionalists. Indeed, old feuds over
removal and acculturation simply found new fuel in debates over slavery and Southern alliances.
Elites and traditionalists imagined different futures for their new homelands in the West. Elites
saw themselves as part of wider, slave-holding South and allied with the Confederacy
accordingly. Traditionalists rejected this premise and instead viewed the promise of neutrality as
the best course of action. Formal alliances could not paper over these deep differences. These
deep schisms within the Five Tribes revealed themselves, and by the autumn of 1861, the Five
Tribes found themselves on the precipice of their own Civil War.
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Chapter Two: Fight and Flight
Although all Five Tribes aligned with the Confederate States in 1861, Confederate-Indian
treaties rested upon a shaky foundation. With political, social, and even martial pressure bearing
in from all sides, Indian elites pushed through Confederate treaties with which a large number of
traditional Indians dissented. This voice of dissent, smothered in the summer heat of 1861, could
not be contained as time wore on. Traditionalist Indians who once desired neutrality were now
pushed into Unionism, and these Union Indians—men, women, and children—all coalesced
around the Creek chief Opothleyahola in the fall and winter months.
Confederate leaders could not accept Opothleyahola’s intransigence. The Creek
chieftain’s presence undermined Confederate power among the Five Tribes and threatened to
weaken support for the Southern cause by offering full-bloods a Unionist sanctuary. Determined
to crush Opothleyahola’s opposition, the Confederacy launched a military offensive in the winter
of 1861 that drove thousands of Unionist Indians out of the Territory and caused untold
suffering. The offensive, however, failed to prevent schisms from growing among the Five
Tribes, particularly the Creeks, Seminoles, and Cherokees. In short, although early battlefield
victories gave the Confederates undisputed military control over Indian Territory, it weakened
their political control.
This Confederate campaign against Opothleyahola has largely been forgotten by Civil
War historians. A minor military affair on the far western border, it perhaps seems to merit little
attention. But upon closer examination of the 1861 Confederate offensive in Indian Territory, it
becomes clear historians can learn much from this dusty footnote in American history. The
campaign against Opothleyahola radically altered the war in the Confederate borderlands. The
Cherokee tribe, with whom the Confederacy had worked so hard to ally, quickly splintered as the
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campaign progressed, proving that for many poor, traditional Indians, loyalty to the Confederate
cause was feeble at best. Moreover, the exile of thousands of Unionist Indians into Kansas acted
as a catalyst, forcing the United States to finally recognize the sad affairs in Indian Territory and
take action.
From a wider perspective, however, the war in Indian Territory adds complexion to the
wartime Confederacy. Whites and Indians fought alongside and under one another in an attempt
to defend the Confederate borderland. This racial cooperation speaks less to an enlightenment of
racial views, but instead to the acknowledgement by both white Southerners and elite Indians
that military cooperation would be mutually beneficial. As Chapter One detailed, white
Southerners took an interest in Indian politics during the secession crisis of 1861. That interest
in Indian affairs continued once hostilities began. Whites wanted to see Confederate Indian
Territory defended, if only to protect Arkansas and Texas from Federal incursions. Elite Indians,
who saw themselves as part of Southern society, were willing to fight for a place within the
Confederacy. Thus, white Southerners and acculturated Indians battled together for the
Confederate borderlands throughout much of the war.
The Opothleyahola campaign in particular merits special attention. By all accounts the
campaign fails to conform to historians’ conceptions of how the war was prosecuted in its
infancy. The Confederate 1861 winter offensive targeted Unionists of all stripes, including
civilians, and was meant to harass and remove those who failed to acknowledge Confederate
authority. The exodus of Opothleyahola’s followers remains of one the most heart-rending and
relatively unknown chapters of the Civil War. Traveling hundreds of miles in the dead of winter,
hounded by Confederate pursuers and bereft of provisions or shelter, thousands of Union Indians
trekked north and many died on the march or in the squalor of refugee camps. The “hard-war”
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depicted by historians usually arises in 1863-’64; in the Confederate borderlands, hard-war
exhibited itself from the very beginning. By closely examining the Opothleyahola campaign,
then, historians gain not only a greater understanding of how the Civil War in Indian Territory
developed, but also how war in the far West complicates traditional conceptions of race and war
within the Confederacy.

As soon as the Five Tribes joined the Confederacy, war fever swept through the
Territory. Regiments were quickly raised for Confederate service, units almost uniformly led by
wealthy Indian elites. The same men who had brought the war to the Territory were now to lead
them through it. Despite apparent Cherokee unity under the Confederate flag, the rivalry
between Chief John Ross and Stand Watie continued. The result was two Cherokee regiments:
the 1st Cherokee Mounted Rifles led by John Ross’ nephew, and the 2nd Cherokee Mounted
Rifles led by Stand Watie himself. The Creeks likewise raised two mounted units for
Confederate service, to be headed by brothers Daniel and Chilly of the influential McIntosh clan.
The Seminoles coalesced in a battalion around the leadership of their chief, John Jumper. The
Choctaws and Chickasaws jointly raised two mounted regiments as well, one led by Tandy
Walker and the other by former U.S. Indian agent Douglas Hancock Cooper.49
The Five Tribes’ treaties with the Confederate States promised that these outfits would be
furnished weapons and supplies by the Confederacy. Moreover, Indian troops were protected by
treaty from serving outside of Indian Territory; these troops were to be used strictly in defense of
their homelands. The promise of weapons, supplies, pay, and staying close to home lured many
to the Stars and Bars. By the end of 1861, 5,460 soldiers were serving in Confederate Indian
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regiments. Based on the 1860 population of the Territory, excluding slaves, approximately one
in ten Indians joined the Confederate army. If it is assumed that roughly half the Territorial
population in 1861 was female, a reasonable conjecture tells us that roughly one in five Indian
males donned Confederate gray by year’s end.50
Despite their designations and origins, these regiments were not comprised solely of
Native-Americans. White men enlisted alongside their native comrades in Indian units. Hailing
from Arkansas and Texas, white neighbors proved willing to cross the border and serve
alongside “civilized” Native-Americans. In doing so, they highlighted the continued interest of
white neighbors regarding the fate of the borderland.
George Legrand Washington was a 26 year old schoolteacher from Cincinnati, Arkansas,
near the Cherokee border, when the Civil War broke out. Hailing from a Southern, slave-holding
family, George enlisted in the Cane Hill Rifles, Company D of the Third Arkansas Infantry in
July, 1861. Within a month, George and the rest of the Third Arkansas found themselves
engaged in “the fiercest and most terrific part” of the Battle of Wilson’s Creek in southwest
Missouri on August 10. Subjected to artillery bombardment and “exposed to a wasting fire,” the
Third Arkansas suffered nearly 22% casualties, including George Washington himself, who was
“wounded slightly.”51
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Technically in state, not Confederate, service, the Third Arkansas disbanded not long
after the fight at Wilson’s Creek. Undeterred, however, George Washington was again in
Southern service by 1862, this time among the Cherokees in Indian Territory. Perhaps drawing
upon his teacher’s background, George served as a clerk for the 2nd Cherokee Mounted Rifles
(Watie’s command) for the remainder of the war.52
Throughout the war, George Washington discovered a friend in fellow Arkansan
schoolteacher Isaac Asbury Clarke, who also served with the Confederate Army in Indian
Territory as a clerk. Studying at the University of Missouri in 1861, Clarke penned in January
that, “The thought of the proud fabric of the American Government’s being destroyed is
revolting to true patriotism. I am for the Union. May it yet be preserved.” Although Clarke
recognized the possibility of Arkansas’ secession, he remained hopeful that “the people they will
prove true to the Union.” Yet by August Isaac was a quartermaster in the service of the South;
he too appears to have gone north to Wilson’s Creek, though he likely saw no action. The
recommendation of another officer enabled Clarke gain another quartermaster’s position with the
Confederate Cherokees under Stand Watie; later he would serve in Commissary Department with
the 1st Creek Mounted Volunteers.53
The “scion of an old and influential Virginia family,” William E. Rosser’s family
suffered financial troubles in 1849, sold their Virginia home and most of their slaves, and started
for a new life on a 640 acre farm along the Sabine River in Panola County, Texas. Only three at
the time of their arrival, by all accounts William and his siblings enjoyed a true Texan
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upbringing, toiling the fields and keeping an eye out for wild animals. Family tradition holds
that one slave was killed by an alligator on the Sabine.54
With the outbreak of civil war in 1861, the Rosser children had decisions to make.
William’s brother Thomas Lafayette Rosser, as the eldest son, was completing his fourth year at
West Point where he had befriended the likes of George Armstrong Custer and John Pelham.
William, on the other hand, remained in Texas, just on the cusp of manhood at 17. Both brothers
decided to join the Confederate cause, but their paths couldn’t have been more different. While
Thomas went on to fame and accolades as a Confederate major-general of cavalry in the east
under the dashing J.E.B. Stuart, William travelled north to Fort Washita, Indian Territory and
enlisted, rather ingloriously, as a corporal in the 1st Choctaw and Chickasaw Mounted Rifles.55
It is unknown how many white men in total served in Indian regiments. Company E of
the 1st Choctaw and Chickasaw Mounted Rifles was comprised entirely of Texans, who had
seized possession of Fort Washita that summer. Other whites, such as Washington, Clarke, and
Rosser, simply crossed the border on their own initiative and enlisted alongside their Indian
allies. It would be reasonable to assume then, that perhaps several hundred whites served in
Indian regiments.56
Both wartime Southern leaders and contemporary historians portray a conservative
Confederacy built upon the principles white superiority, African-American inferiority, and the
preservation of slavery. Confederate Vice-President Alexander Stephens, in his infamous 1861
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“Cornerstone” speech, put the matter succinctly: “Our new Government[’s]…foundations are
laid, it cornerstone rests, upon the great truth that the negro is not equal to the white man; that
slavery, subordination to the superior race, is his natural and moral condition.” Historians have
largely agreed with Stephen’s analysis of his own nation and have placed race and white
superiority at the forefront of the Confederacy’s cause and identity. Charles B. Dew’s Apostles
of Disunion exposes how Southerners seceded over fears of racial equality, war, and
amalgamation. In Confederate Reckoning, Stephanie McCurry highlights how Southern leaders
sought to reinforce conceptions of Southern citizenry as white and male. Similarly, William C.
Davis casts the Confederacy as an attempt by white, privileged oligarchs to retain control over
the South. Slavery has been declared the “central” and “crucial component” of the new Southern
nation. In sum, the Confederate States anchored much of its identity in racial terms, emphasizing
white superiority over black inferiors.57
How then, can we reconcile white Southern men’s service alongside and even under their
Indian counterparts with white superiority so central to Southern identity? White Confederate
service within and alongside Indian regiments testifies to the continued interest of white
Southerners in Indian Territory’s fate once the war began. Just as whites proved themselves
concerned with the secession of the Five Tribes in the summer of 1861, so too were they devoted
to ensuring that Indian Territory remained a in the Confederacy’s grasp upon the outbreak of
hostilities. And ensuring that Indian Territory remained a Confederate borderlands necessitated
working alongside the denizens of that place—Native-Americans. White Southerners did not
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view Native-Americans as racial equals; the often-times condescending or amused way they
speak of their native allies testifies to this sense of superiority. Yet Southerners acknowledged
the value of Indian warriors to the Confederate cause and could fight alongside them in
defending the Confederate borderland. Thus the war created an alliance of necessity between
white Southerners of the region, who wanted Indian Territory to remain a Confederate buffer,
and acculturated Indians, who saw alliance as a means of continuing to integrate themselves into
Southern society.
This wartime racial hierarchy would soon be put to the test. Like other upper South
states straddling the border between the Union and the Confederacy, the war came early to
Indian Territory. Unlike early confrontations in Virginia and Missouri, however, the threat to
Confederate control of Indian Territory came not from invading Yankees, but instead from
recalcitrant Indians themselves.
The treaties of alliance forged between the Five Tribes and the Confederacy in the fall of
1861 did not represent the true inclinations of many Indians. Fearful of abolitionism and pushed
by the sometimes forceful machinations of their white neighbors, acculturated Indian elites
entered into agreements with which significant numbers of traditional Native-Americans
disagreed. This disaffection took an immediate form, as well over 4,000 Creeks and Seminoles
gathered under the leadership of Creek chieftain Opothleyahola throughout the fall. In
communication with Federal authorities in Kansas, hopeful of U.S. assistance, and confident of
support among dissident Indians, Opothleyahola firmly rejected Confederate overtures of peace
and alliance.
Initially camped in Creek Nation in the heart of the Territory, Opothleyahola’s swelling
ranks soon stripped the area of forage. With huge herds of cattle, the party moved northwest into
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the fringes of Cherokee land. The Unionist Indians burned the homes of several Confederate
sympathizers along the way, and hundreds of local slaves escaped into the relative freedom of
Opothleyahola’s ranks. Although having given no indication of launching an offensive,
Opothleyahola’s mere presence in Indian Territory undermined the Confederacy’s brand new
authority in the region. Recognizing the need to “either compel submission to the
authorities…or drive [Opothleyahola] and his party from the country,” former U.S. Indian agent
and now Confederate Colonel Douglas H. Cooper determined to take the offensive in November,
1861.58
Although Douglas Cooper would of course call upon the Indian troops at his disposal
(including the 1st Choctaw and Chickasaw Mounted Rifles which he personally commanded),
Cooper also utilized the services of Texan troopers making their way north through Indian
Territory in hopes of joining the fray in Missouri. These Texan troopers hailed from the rough
young settlements dotting north Texas, places like Sherman, Marshall, and Fort Worth. Ready to
fight, they brooked no sympathy towards the enemy’s cause. Shortly after the Ninth Texas
Cavalry’s enlistment, the regimental adjutant was accused of being an abolitionist. While
officers debated the adjutant’s fate, the boys “en masse took him out and hanged him.” Just as
Texans had proven forceful in deciding the political allegiance of the Five Tribes, they proved
forceful in enforcing allegiance within their ranks as well. And it was these young Texans who
splashed across the Red River Indian Territory in 1861 to once again enforce their will on
wayward Indians, this time on behalf of the Confederacy. As they moved across the landscape,
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these white Southerners got their first real glimpse of Indians, their lifestyles, and their
homelands. The Texans formed mixed impressions of what they encountered.59
Private A.W. Sparks’ first experience in Indian Territory proved a bright one. Crossing
the Red River into Choctaw Nation with the rest of the 9th Texas Cavalry on the last day of
October, 1861, the regiment spent their first night in Indian Territory in the small trading town of
Boggy Depot. “[A] noted trading point where many trinkets and notions were sold by the
Indians,” the boys of the Ninth delighted in the Indian goods. “The soldiers of the regiment,”
Sparks recalled, “bought quite a lot of these gaudy things and on the march next day presented
all the colors of the rainbow in fringes, handkerchiefs, shawls, etc.”60
While Sparks’ comrades indulged in the Indian trinkets, still others took more serious
stock of the land around them. Private James C. Bates of the Ninth Texas thought the Choctaw
Nation “very fine country,” and took the trouble to climb to the “most beautiful summit” of a
large hill and enjoy “one of the finest views imaginable.” First Sergeant George L. Griscom
spent time around Boggy Depot “hunting a great abundance of all Kinds of game.” John
Douglas Cater, of the 3rd Texas Cavalry, recalled that Indian Territory “was a beautiful country
then,” dotted with forests, prairies, and “little mountains and valleys.” “The Indians,” reported
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Cater, “lived in little villages of huts for houses and there were some patches of corn and
watermelons.”61
As the various Texan regiments marched deeper into Indian Territory, they eventually
rendezvoused with their Indian comrades-in-arms. The Ninth Texas was greeted by the “whoops
& yells & screams” of Indians “painted red with streaks & spots of black presenting a most
hideous appearance.” The Indians engaged in “the most extravagant demonstrations of joy—
firing guns shouting & war dancing until nearly morning.” The next day brought even greater
celebrations, as adjutant George Grissom confided to his diary that “they [the Indians] gave us
the real war dance of both nations with which our boys were delighted & man (self)
participated.” The Third Texas enjoyed a similar welcome. “Gen. Cooper’s Indians received us
with a great joy as we march though their camp,” A.W. Sparks wrote, “and fired us a grand
salute, which we returned with about the same unmilitary regularity.”62
For the first time, Southern soldiers beheld their Indian counterparts. “It was about this
time I first saw the regiment of Col. Stanwats [Stand Watie], a fine looking body of men,” wrote
Private Sparks. “I was told they were of Indian blood, but if they differed from any other
regiment in soldier appearance I could not detect it. So different were they from other Indian
soldiers that I had met.” Colonel Watie’s regiment of Cherokees stood apart from Colonel
Drew’s unit “as they all appeared to be full bloods.” James Bates held a decidedly less confident
view of his allies. Reflecting upon the unified command of Indian and Texan troops, Bates
thought “[t]wo hundred well armed men can rout the whole rabble…I am heartily tired of Indian
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alliances if all are like [this].” While white Texans’ opinions of their Indian comrades may have
varied from amusement to admiration to scorn, they nevertheless proved willing to fight
alongside Native-Americans. The campaign against Opothleyahola, or “Gouge” as many Texans
referred to him, offered the first opportunity for the two groups to fight side by side.63
On November 15th, a motley column Chickasaws, Choctaws, Creeks, Seminoles and
Texans, around 1,400 men in all, set out to hunt down old Gouge under the leadership of Col.
Douglas Cooper. Quickly finding Opothleyahola’s trail, by the 19th the Confederates had caught
up to the old Creek chieftain; the smoke from his campfires dotted the sky. Anxious to close
with the enemy, the Ninth Texas Cavalry charged forward with Creeks and Choctaws in support,
only to find the camp “recently deserted.” Still, the capture of a few prisoners assured the
Texans that they enemy lay ahead, and they ploughed onwards “at a furious rate” across three
miles of open prairie.64
Approaching a belt of timber guarding two round hills, the Texans foolishly “charged &
came into line in fine style.” Thinking the enemy was on the run, the Texans instead charged
headlong into the main body of Opothleyahola’s force of several thousand, which promptly
opened fire into the flanks of the Southern troopers. George Griscom recalled that the enemy
Indians sent “a pony chased by dogs” through the Texans ranks in an effort to stampede the
Rebels’ horses. The Ninth Texas found itself in a precarious, and eerie, position. Outnumbered
and slowly retreating towards the main Confederate force, the Texans fought in twilight, the
flickering flames of prairie fires “in a half a Dozen place affording them light to fight by.”65
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Relief arrived as the Choctaws and Chickasaws took the field, led by Col. Cooper. The
Confederate Indians met their Union counterparts and “a bloody fight of 15 minutes” ensued.
The Texans were careful not to again push forward into the fray, as “it was impossible for us to
tell even in daylight which of the Indians were our friends and which our enemies.” The short,
vicious fight among the Indians—some Confederate, some Union—ultimately resulted in
Opothleyahola’s forces shrinking back into the darkness. The Battle of Round Mountain, the
first major Civil War engagement in Indian Territory, was over. Confederate casualties proved
relatively light: six killed, five wounded and missing. Union casualties are unknown; Col.
Cooper claimed old Gouge suffered 110 men lost, but this number seems exaggerated.66
Although Opothleyahola enjoyed superior numbers and advantageous terrain, it seems
likely that Opothleyahola retreated due to his concern for the well-being of the thousands of
civilian refugees under his protection. The next day, the Confederates entered the chieftain’s
abandoned camp and savored the spoils of war. In his desire to quickly escape the enemy’s
reach, Opothleyahola left behind a dozen wagons loaded with sugar, salt, coffee, flour and other
supplies. Oxen, cattle, sheep, over a hundred ponies, and several carriages were all found
abandoned by the pursuing Confederates. More darkly, also found were the bodies of two
Southern soldiers “taken prisoner by them & beaten to death.” George Griscom experienced
“feeling for the 1st time as one does when leaving comrades slain on the field” and witnessed
Confederate “Creeks taking some scalps the 1st I ever saw.” Though a small skirmish, the
ugliness of war was on full display.67
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Interestingly silent in Confederate sources is any real discussion regarding for whom all
these captured supplies were intended. While it was widely known that Opothleyahola was
harboring large numbers of civilian refugees, Confederate commanders and soldiers alike
expressed little remorse for driving these hapless civilian further from their homes. The large
quantities of food and supplies captured after Round Mountain were just as certainly intended for
the needs and wants of women and children as for old Gouge’s warriors. By forcing
Opothleyahola to abandon his supplies, the Confederate offensive was in turn inflicting suffering
upon the civilians Opothleyahola harbored.
The Unionist Indians were given a brief respite from Confederate aggression following
the Round Mountain fight when Federal forces in Missouri threatened to invade northern
Arkansas. General Cooper’s forces were compelled to spend several weeks near the Arkansas
border, ready to repel any Federal offensive. When none proved forthcoming, however, Douglas
Cooper again renewed his assault on Opothleyahola. Again, Cooper’s force was comprised of
the 1st Choctaw and Chickasaw Mounted Rifles, the 1st Creek Mounted Rifles, a battalion of
Choctaws, and the 9th Texas Cavalry. Also present was a sizable detachment of the 2nd Cherokee
Mounted Rifles, an outfit comprised primarily of traditionalist Indians and supporters of John
Ross, who were led by Ross’ nephew John Drew. Drew’s regiment contained more than a few
members of the Keetowah Society, whose stance against acculturation and slavery made them
uneasy bedfellows with the rest of the Rebel soldiers in Cooper’s command.68
In early December, Confederate forces again encountered their Union foes on the banks
of Bird Creek in Cherokee Nation. Learning that perhaps Opothleyahola possessed “a desire to
make peace,” Col. Cooper sent a representative to the Creek warrior ensuring that “we did not
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desire the shedding of blood among the Indians” and proposing peace talks be held. The Rebel
courier, after his visit to Opothleyahola’s camp, returned to Cooper at dusk with stunning news.
Contrary to reports, Opothleyahola had no intentions of buckling, and indeed, “his warriors,
several thousand in number, were all painted for the fight” and intended to attack that night.
There would be no peace among the Indians.69
Worse however, John Drew’s regiment of Cherokees, “panic-stricken, had dispersed,
leaving their tents standing, and in many instances their horses and guns.” Drew’s Cherokees
had not seen action during the Battle of Round Mountain, so as word spread that another fight
with Opothleyahola loomed, many traditionalist Cherokees grappled with the prospect of
fighting other traditionalist Indians with whom they empathized. Exacerbating the situation were
soldiers who belonged to the Keetowah Society, who were perhaps in contact with
Opothleyahola’s camp itself. The Keetowahs fanned the flames of panic, warning of an
imminent attack and encouraging the traditionalist Indians to defect. Tying cornhusks to their
hair, the Keetowahs and others slipped away from Drew’s camp and joined their fellow
traditionalists alongside Opothleyahola. When the defected Confederate Keetowah met their
Union counterparts, they exchanged passwords. “Who are you?” one would ask. “Tahlequah—
who are you?” came the response. “I am Keetowah’s son,” was the final response. Armed with
such passwords and devices, Drew’s regiment melted away into the night.70
John Drew’s detachment of the 2nd Cherokee Mounted Rifles had numbered 480 men at
the outset of the campaign. By the end of the night only 60 loyal soldiers remained; the rest had
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deserted or defected to Opothleyahola’s ranks. It marked the only time in the Civil War that a
Confederate regiment defected en masse to the Union side. More importantly, however, the
defection of John Drew’s Cherokees revealed the schism within the Cherokee Nation over
secession and the war. With Opothleyahola’s band and Drew’s defectees, the Cherokee, Creek,
and Seminole Nations all had sizable portions of their male populations serving the Union cause.
The treaties of alliance with the Confederacy formed just a few months prior were already
collapsing; three of the Five Tribes were falling into their own intra-tribal civil wars.71
Surely this must have been an unnerving moment for Colonel Cooper. Opothleyahola
was coming, and the Cherokees were gone. Luckily for the Cooper, however, reports of Gouge’s
imminent attack proved false. Still, Cooper now knew that his enemy numbered over 2,000
warriors, and Cooper’s command had shrunk by some 400. On the morning of December 9,
after spending an anxious night “quietly awaiting the enemy,” Cooper began to withdraw his
command. Withdrawing in the face of the enemy proved an impossible task, however.
Opothleyahola’s force assaulted Cooper’s rearguard and forced the second battle of the
campaign.72
The Confederates reacted quickly. Cooper formed his troops into three columns and sent
them flying towards the enemy, who were ensconced behind Bird Creek, or Chusto-Talasah as
the Indians called it. The Union position was formidable. Opothleyahola’s men had taken
shelter behind a steep, horseshoe bend in Bird Creek, “densely covered with heavy timber,
matted undergrowth, and thickets, and fortified additionally with prostrate logs.” Stretching over
a mile in length, the center of the enemy’s line was anchored by a small house. Opothleyahola
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had proven himself an able commander; while strategically bringing on a general engagement, he
had cleverly provided his men with a strong defensive position tactically.
The “rattle of guns and the chatter of the Indians” warned the Confederates of the enemy
ahead, and the Rebels were forced to dismount and assault the position on foot. The Creeks, on
the Confederate left, attacked first, “charging the enemy with great impetuosity.” Shortly after,
the Texans and few remaining Cherokees stormed the center of the Union line, and the Choctaws
and Chickasaws struck from the Confederate right. James Bates, with the Ninth Texas in the
middle of the fray, wrote home that the fight around the house “raged with the greatest fury.
Twice we drove them from it and were each time compelled to retire ourselves. The third time
however we succeeded in holding it.” It was Bates’ first engagement, and to his surprise, he
found that after “the first few rounds fired—I ceased to have any apprehension whatever of
danger.” He quickly learned to decipher the sounds different bullets made, and also noted, “An
arrow produces a sound something like a bird flying swiftly through the air.”73
Although Opothleyahola’s men had been bludgeoned back, they continued to fight on.
Accounts differ somewhat on what occurred next. In his official report, Colonel Cooper claimed
that as darkness approached, the enemy “disappeared from our entire front” and only after
Opothleyahola’s retreat did the Confederates withdraw. James Bates thought differently of the
matter. Cooper’s order to retreat was obeyed with “some reluctance,” and Bates felt that with
“one more hour of daylight we would have routed them completely.” “As it was,” Bates penned
to his mother, “we were forced to leave the enemy in possession of part of the field and though
others think differently I cant call our victory complete.”74
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Once again, the Confederates held a dubious victory at Chustu-Talasah, owing more to
Opothleyahola’s decision to retreat than any clear battlefield decision. The Confederate forces,
numbering 1,100 without Drew’s Cherokees, suffered 15 killed and 37 wounded.
Opothleyahola’s force likely numbered above 2,000. Col. Cooper claimed the enemy’s loss to
be approximately 500, although such a high figure is almost surely fictitious. Opothleyahola
continued his trek northwards, moving ever closer to the relative safety of Kansas. Colonel
Cooper, running low on ammunition and recognizing the numerical inferiority of his command,
withdrew to Fort Gibson to resupply and regroup.75
Despite two sustained efforts, the campaign against the Unionist Indians had not gone
well. Many Cherokees had proven themselves Rebels in name only, unwilling to take up arms
against their fellow traditionalists and Keetowah brethren. Although still sidling northward,
Opothleyahola remained in Cherokee country, a constant symbol of defiance and an
embarrassing thorn in the Confederates, and Col. Cooper’s, side. Acknowledging his need for
additional help, Cooper reached out to Colonel James McIntosh in Arkansas for assistance.
Although Cooper already held Texan troops destined for McIntosh’s command, the beleaguered
Confederate colonel asked for “additional white force” to finally quash Opothleyahola. “The true
men among the Cherokees,” Cooper warned direly, “must be supported and protected or we shall
lose the Indian Territory.” Cooper’s plea for reinforcements was a tacit admission of his failures
thus far.76
On December 17, James Bates wrote his brother in law, “Things are rapidly approaching
a climax in this section…” The very same day, Col. James McIntosh trotted out of Van Buren,
Arkansas with 1,600 Texan and Arkansas horseman to “settle matters in the nation.” Arriving at
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Fort Gibson in eastern Cherokee Nation, McIntosh conferred with Cooper and the two planned to
entrap Opothleyahola in a wide pincer movement. Riding out of Fort Gibson with 1,380
troopers, McIntosh’s force encountered Opothleyahola’s warriors along Shoal Creek on
December 26. The Union Indians had positioned themselves on a hilltop just beyond the creek, a
commanding defensive position. The Seminoles in Opothleyahola’s command were headed by
chief Halek Tustanuggee, who had spent years in Florida fighting the United States Army in a
futile attempt to save his homeland. Decades later and hundreds of miles west, he now cleverly
positioned his warriors behind trees to repel the ambitions of the Confederate States. “Each tree
on the hill-side screened a stalwart warrior,” McIntosh claimed. Beyond the Seminoles atop the
crest of the hill were Opothelyahola’s Creeks, mounted and ready to sweep away the opposition.
Colonel McIntosh, surveying the scene, determined to fight the enemy here, despite the absence
of Cooper’s men who were miles away.77
Unlike Cooper at Chusto-Talasah, McIntosh refused to send his men into battle
piecemeal and instead simply ordered a mass charge forward by his entire command. “[T]he
order to charge to the top of the hill met a responsive feeling from each gallant heart in the
line…” McIntosh effusively reported, “one wild yell from a thousand throats burst upon the air,
and the living mass hurled itself upon the foe.” The Confederate horseman surged forward,
splashing through the cold creek water and soon found themselves at the base of the rocky hill.
Pvt. John Cater recalled that, “We formed a line of battle in front of them. Bullets and arrows
were coming pretty fast. A feathered arrow passed in front of my face just before we were
ordered to dismount, and produced a strange sensation in me.” The Southerners pushed up the
hill on foot, and the Seminoles fell back into Opothleyahola’s mounted men, producing
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confusion. For a brief moment, the two sides collided at the summit of the hill, at times Indians
and Southerners grappling in hand-to-hand combat. Then the Union Indians went tumbling
back, retreating into “the rocky gorges and deep recesses of the mountains” behind them. The
Confederate troops, instead of immediately pursuing, went back to their horses, remounted, and
then took off in pursuit of their fleeing foe. “Some of those fellows,” John Cater admitted, “were
very brave and daring and would not leave, but continued to shoot.” A last stand by
Opothleyahola’s men at their encampment failed, and the Unionist Indians finally routed and
scattered in all directions. Under the direction of James McIntosh, the Confederates at the Battle
of Chustenahlah accomplished what Douglas Cooper could not; Opothleyahola and the Union
Indians had been decisively defeated. The Confederates suffered 9 killed and 40 wounded; the
Confederates placed their usually bloated figure of the enemy’s casualties at 250.78
As the Confederate regrouped, they took stock of what they had captured. As at Round
Mountain, the loot at Chustenahlah included 30 wagons, 70 oxen, 500 ponies, hundreds of cattle,
sheep, and plenty of provisions and property. Unlike previous engagements, however, the
Confederates were now responsible for hundreds of captured Indians themselves, a testament to
how disastrous the Confederate breakthrough had been for the Union forces. At least 160
women and children, 20 blacks, and one wounded warrior were captured by the Confederate
forces.79
Over the next several days, the chase after Opothleyahola’s retreating party continued.
McIntosh’s men were joined the pursuit by Col. Cooper’s mixed force of Indians and Texans and
Colonel Stand Watie’s 2nd Cherokee Mounted Rifles. Although unable to capture
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Opothleyahola’s main body, by nipping at the heels of Gouge’s force and constant skirmishing,
close to one hundred more prisoners were captured, hundreds of cattle taken, a pair of wagons
burned, and several more warriors killed and wounded. Finally satisfied that Opothleyahola had
been permanently driven from the Territory into Kansas, the hunt was called off.
From a military perspective, the late 1861 campaign against Opothleyahola was a
relatively minor affair. A series of three skirmishes, the campaign drove the wayward Creek
chieftain from Confederate Indian Territory into an unhappy Kansan exile. The number of
troops engaged was relatively small and the military casualties light. The Confederates secured
land of limited strategic importance, and inflicted no real injury on any Federal force or the
broader Union war effort.
Yet from a political perspective, the campaign was a Confederate nightmare that actually
exacerbated the problems it was meant to remedy. In driving Opothleyahola out of the Territory,
Colonel Cooper meant to solidify the Confederacy’s hold over the Five Tribes. Instead, the
campaign fractured the Cherokee Nation along already shaky fault lines, causing hundreds of
sympathetic traditionalist Indians to desert the Confederate cause and take up arms against the
South. Now three of the tribes—Creeks, Seminoles, and Cherokees—were embroiled in their
own internal civil wars. The failure of Cooper to defeat Opothleyahola at Round Mountain and
Chusta-Talasah embarrassed the commander and the Confederacy, and it was only with the
outside help of James McIntosh and his white troops that Gouge was finally defeated.
While Confederates enjoyed their triumph, the sting of defeat for Opothleyahola’s
followers was only the beginning of their sad saga. Unfortunately, few contemporary records
exist detailing their journey north into Kansas, but close reading of Confederate sources and
post-war interviews do provide some insight into their struggles. Although a reasonable estimate
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of Opothleyahola’s force approximates 5,000, it is unclear just how many made the final journey
north to Kansas following the disaster at Chustenahlah. Colonel McIntosh thought old Gouge
took “not more than 400 to 500 Creeks with him.” It is unclear whether McIntosh is referencing
the number of warriors who fled north, or Opothleyahola’s entire party. Considering the
thousands of Creeks, Seminoles, defected Cherokees, and runaway slaves with Opothleyahola,
and the Confederate’s capture of only several hundred Unionists, it seems likely that several
thousand Unionists ultimately made the trek. Documents from late January, 1862 indicate that
nearly 6,000 Indians had taken shelter in Kansas. While Chustenahlah dispersed the Unionist
Indians, and perhaps persuaded some to come into the Confederate fold, it appears that most
Unionist Indians stayed true to their sentiments and accepted a Kansan exile.80
The journey north into Kansas by Opothleyahola’s followers is one of the most
heartbreaking, and relatively unknown, chapters of the Civil War. An exodus of immense
suffering and fear, thousands of refugees were pushed from their homes to camps on the cold
plains of Kansas. The Confederate pursuit of the Unionist Indians forced Gouge’s followers to
both fend off Confederate attacks on their rear guard and push on at a quick pace. Jackman
Pidgeon remembered the stories his mother Smaddie told of their unhappy journey north. “There
were times, as she told,” Pidgeon related, “when they were overtaken by their pursuers, those
serving with the Confederates,” but Opothleyahola’s sheer numbers allowed his followers to
fend off their attackers. At one point, Smaddie Pidgeon’s party was overtaken by the
Confederates, and Unionist warriors were forced to “check the rear attackers.” Smaddie watched
the fight unfold from a hilltop. “At dark, as the firing kept on, the scene…seemed to be like the
flicker of fireflies, with reports of guns heard and flashes here and there of the shooting.” These
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attacks cause the greatest panic. James Scott, ten years old at the time, witnessed one such
heartrending scene during a Confederate assault. “One time we saw a little baby on its blanket in
the woods. Everyone was running because at attack was expected and no one had the time to
stop and pick up the child. As it saw the people running by, the little child began to wave its
little hands. The child had no knowledge that he had been deserted.”81
These constant attacks, beyond exciting panic, fear, and suffering, also meant that
wagons, cattle, and other much needed supplies often had to be abandoned in order to escape.
James Scott recalled years later, “We faced many hardships, we were often without food, the
children cried from weariness and the cold, we fled and left our wagons with much needed
provisions, clothing and other necessities…When our provisions went low, some of the members
of the tribe turned to eating horse flesh.”82
Other memories suggest incredible acts of brutality took place. “Some women carrying
children would be overtaken by Confederate soldiers and the soldiers snatched the children from
the arms of the mothers and smashed their heads against the trees.” It cannot be stated for sure
whether or not such horrific incidents occurred; time and hand-me-down tales can warp any
story. Yet considering the reports of scalping and murder by Southern Indians during the
campaign, it’s not implausible that the sad tale was relayed correctly. Missionary Stephen
Foreman, writing in his diary on January 3, 1862, relayed news given to him by soldier returning
from the campaign. “They are just from Opothleyahotah’s [sic] camp, whither they went to give
him, as they said a brushing,” Foreman notes. “It is estimated that they killed about two hundred
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prisoners, including some women and children.” Again, whether such wholesale slaughter
occurred is unclear. But the evidence does suggest that the campaign was a dirty one indeed.83
The environment proved almost as vicious a foe as the Rebel pursuers. Many
Confederate accounts of the period reference the bitter cold and lack of forage. James Bates
wrote of taking walks to keep warm in the night. “Cold enough to freeze my breath on my
mustache,” he complained in his diary. In chasing Opothleyahola, Bates also took note of the
“very rugged country” through which they passed. George Griscom agreed. “Very rough
Broken country” his brief diary entry admits. Even James McIntosh notes in his official report
that the Confederates, and hence also Opothleyahola’s sad band, marched “on ground covered
with snow and at other times facing the chilly blasts from the north.” Lindy Scott was told
stories of how “The leg, arm, toes or fingers of some of the Indians were lost by being frozen and
they would have to be amputated in the best manner possible.” The lack of clothing showed, too,
as “Many of the Indians [went] barefooted in the sleet and snow.”84
Arrival along the Verdigris River basin in Kansas offered shelter from the Confederates
but not from the elements. Poor, handmade tents—stitched together with rags, handkerchiefs,
anything—offered little protection from the snow and wind. When an army surgeon visited in
February, he found seven children stark naked. Two thousand ponies died in the Kansas camps
from the cold, and poor sanitation made the water “unfit for use.” The refugees continued to
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suffer until their eventual removal to the land around LeRoy, Kansas, and the arrival of supplies
from the United States.85
Thousands of Creeks, Seminoles, Cherokees, runaway slaves, men, women, children, and
elderly made the three hundred mile exodus from Indian Territory to the Verdigris River in
Kansas. Hounded by Rebel pursuers, whipped by the wind and cold, bereft of provisions or
property, the journey exacted an unknown price, although surely many died along the way.
United States Indian Agent George Cutler, reflecting upon the refugee’s journey, stated simply,
“I doubt much if history records an instance of sufferings equal to these.”86
The campaign against Opothleyahola revealed how the war in the borderlands would be
fought. Mounted, mobile military forces engaged one another in small battles that inevitably
embroiled the local civilian population into war’s suffering. It is no mistake that almost every
Indian regiment raised in 1861 for the Confederacy was mounted, nor that the majority of white
units that fought in the Territory were also mounted. This preference for going to war on horse
was prevalent throughout the Trans-Mississippi theater, where one hundred sixty-one mounted
units were raised for Confederate service during the war. As Stephen B. Oates argues in
Confederate Cavalry West of the River, the use of mobile troops proved exceedingly useful in
chasing down wily Opothleyahola and exhibited “the tremendous striking power” of cavalry.
Considering the vast spaces and comparatively small populations of Trans-Mississippi states,
cavalry created a much needed mobility for commands that needed to protect long, vulnerable
frontiers.87
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Historians have long-offered a declensionist narrative regarding violence, brutality, and
civilian suffering in the Civil War, whether from top-down official policy to soldier’s view of the
conflict. Mark Grimsley’s Hard Hand of War details how Union military policy evolved from a
conservative, conciliatory approach to a policy of “hard war,” meant to “demoralize Southern
civilians and ruin the Confederate economy.” Gerald F. Linderman’s Embattled Courage also
depicts a war that grew increasingly harsh overtime, highlighting 1864 as the tipping point for
“warfare of terror” that was waged against Southern civilians. Charles Royster utilizes
“Stonewall” Jackson and William Tecumseh Sherman as mediums through which an
increasingly violent, aggressive war was persecuted. All of these works depict a war that grew
mean over time, where civilians were slowly but inexorably pulled into and targeted by the
conflict around them.88
The campaign against Opothleyahola stands at odds with this declensionist understanding
of the war. On the Confederate borderlands, in the first year of the war when most of North and
South lay untouched, an organized, mixed-race Southern military force battled a largely
unaggressive foe whose number consisted largely of civilians. In launching an offensive against
Opothleyahola, Confederate soldiers were deliberately seeking to punish and expel both soldiers
and civilians who disagreed with their vision of a Confederate Indian Territory. They sought to
demoralize Unionists, exorcise them from their homes, and force them to submit to Confederate
authority or leave.
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It would be too coy to suggest that this offensive stemmed from any official war policy; it
did not. It is more than likely that Confederate authorities in Richmond and perhaps even Little
Rock little understood just what the expulsion of Opothleyahola would entail. A disconnect
between Confederate high command and Confederate colonels on the ground allowed such a
brutal undertaking to go forward. Yet the absence of any real description of civilian suffering in
Confederate sources remains striking. As McIntosh’s, Cooper’s, and Watie’s troopers hunted
down parties of Unionist Indians and captured hundreds of women and children, they saw firsthand the suffering and devastation they inflicted on their foe. Blood on ice from bare-feet,
frostbitten limbs, abandoned children, perhaps even brutal murder would all have been visible.
The silence in Southern sources suggests that these Confederates were too uncomfortable to
record what they had seen or had no qualms about the ugliness of the conflict in which they were
engaged. Perhaps, too, the refugees’ race also allowed Southerners to persecute a campaign
against civilians. Although willing to serve alongside Confederate Indians, often of a more
genteel, elite background, white Confederates in particular may have taken solace that they were
hunting down traditionalist, uncivilized, and disloyal Indians. One wonders if such a campaign
would ever have been mounted against a Unionist camp of white refugees?
This campaign does not overturn the wider narrative of scholars who depict a war that
grew hard over time. But it complicates that narrative, adding an outlier for which historians
must account. It suggests that the war in the Confederate borderland was hard from the
beginning, civilians were in danger from the beginning, complicated race relations shaped the
conflict, and that Confederate control over Indian Territory was tenuous at best.
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Chapter Three: The Federal Indian Expedition
The frontier sky illuminated an eclectic column of troops moving through Indian
Territory. Whites and Indians marched together, the Indians singing lustily, “in good stile and in
fine spirits [sic].” Their uniforms were ill-fitting; the “new uniforms and small Military caps on
their Hugh Heads of Hair made rather a Comecal Ludecrous appearance [sic].” Still, the Indians
had every reason to be happy. They were coming home. The uniforms they wore were blue, not
gray, and they marched to liberate their homelands. It was June, 1862, and the Federal army had
finally arrived in Indian Territory.89
With the arrival of Federal forces in Indian Territory in the summer of 1862, the scope of
conflict in Indian Territory mushroomed in size. Many Indians rushed to the Union cause, and
intra-tribal civil wars ripped apart the landscape for three more years. Two narratives emerge
from the war waged in Indian Territory. First, the First Indian Expedition projected Union
power into the heart of the Cherokee and Creek Nations. Militarily, the war in the Confederate
borderlands differed from the war in the East. Relatively few military engagements of
significant size took place, although those that did proved quite significant in shaping events.
Instead, the war in Indian Territory consisted of an endless series of skirmishes, raids, and
guerrilla actions. This brutal type of conflict better mirrors the conflict in places like southern
Missouri, northern Arkansas, and eastern Tennessee than the great campaigns in Virginia and
Pennsylvania. Moreover, both Northern and Southern whites, Indians from a variety of tribes,
and African-Americans all participated in this borderlands bloodletting.
Second, as often occurs in guerrilla wars, the lines between legitimate military actions
and banditry blurred, with civilians often suffering at the hands of enemies whose allegiance to
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any real cause other than their own was questionable. For Native Americans who attempted to
ride out the war years in their homes, desolation and suffering was often their reward. Many
Native-Americans, in an attempt to preserve their lives and property, instead sought refuge
around garrisoned military posts or in the border communities of Kansas and north Texas.

The exodus of Opothleyahola’s followers in late 1861 had driven Unionist presence from
Indian Territory. Yet Confederate leaders had failed to take into account the long-term
ramifications of their actions. Besides splintering the Cherokee Nation, they had also sent
thousands of forlorn Indian refugees into exile in Union Kansas. It did not take long for these
Union Indians to begin clamoring for a return to their homes, and for the United States
government to finally address the unhappy situation in Indian Territory. In short, by defeating
Opothleyahola and sending him north, the Confederacy was providing the impetus for a Federal
invasion, a far greater challenge than Opothleyahola alone ever posed.
Kansas strained under the refugees pouring across its borders. Over 13,000 refugees,
mostly Indians, huddled in camps along the Verdigris and Neosho Rivers. This figure does not
include the thousands of black slaves from Missouri, Indian Territory, and even Texas who
sought Kansas in search of freedom. These refugees wanted to go home, and more than a few
expressed a willingness to do so in a blue uniform. Almost from their arrival, informal plans
were underway by local Federal authorities to utilize this source of manpower. In the winter of
1861-’62, General David Hunter and tribal leaders among the refugees “agreed, that two
Regiments should be raised of loyal Indians.” Their express purpose would be to “act as Home
Guards, who, with a military force of white men to accompany them, would move into the Indian
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Territory, to expel the Rebel Forces and hold the country.” Such an expedition would then allow
the refugees to “be taken home.”90
By February, enlistments were underway. The First Indian Home Guard consisted of
eight companies of Creeks and two companies of Seminoles; many of these recruits had travelled
north with Opothleyahola. The Second Indian Home Guard consisted of members of all Five
Tribes. By June, some 1,600 Indians, along with a number of runaway black slaves and a
smattering of whites, had enlisted in the two regiments. The newly-minted Federal soldiers were
“anxious to learn and full fight.”91
While the United States began to marshal the thousands of Unionist Indians spilling into
Kansas, the Confederate Indians were serving their nation outside of the Territory’s borders. In
January, 1862, Confederate President Jefferson Davis appointed General Earl Van Dorn head of
the Military District of the Trans-Mississippi, and the impetuous Van Dorn had high ambitions
for his post. He hoped to drive the Federal army out of northern Arkansas and reclaim Missouri
for the South—a long-held Confederate dream. Gen. Van Dorn marshaled a force of some
twenty thousand Confederate Arkansas, Texans, and Louisianans to drive back the Yankee foe.
Also included in this force were 2,500 Confederate Indians under General Albert Pike, including
Stand Watie’s and John Drew’s (reconstituted) First and Second Cherokee, Douglas Cooper’s 1st
Choctaw and Chickasaw, and Daniel McIntosh’s 1st Creek regiments.92
According to their treaties with the Confederacy, the Five Tribes’ Indian regiments did
not have to serve outside of the Territory’s borders. General Van Dorn, however, ignored the
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treaties’ stipulations and ordered the Indian troops to assist his forthcoming campaign. Angry
over the treaty violation, many Indians refused to march east into Arkansas. Ultimately only the
First and Second Cherokee would see battle. Had Van Dorn known what the outcome of their
presence would be, he may have simply left the Indian troops in their Territorial homelands.93
On March 7, 1862 at the Battle of Pea Ridge in northwest Arkansas, the twin Cherokee
regiments under Cols. Watie and Drew squared off against two companies of Iowa cavalry and a
Missouri artillery battery. Alongside their Texan comrades, the Cherokees advanced both
mounted and on foot and sent the outnumbered Iowan cavalry flying. Capturing the Missouri
artillery, Confederate cavalrymen—white and Indian alike—conglomerated around the captured
guns, excited by the successful charge and preoccupied with the scene around them. “The
Indians,” remembered one Southerner, “swarmed around the guns like bees, in great confusion,
jabbering and yelling at a furious rate.” Excited by battle and without orders, the situation
quickly grew out of a hand.94
Although the exact details of what happened next are hazy, it is clear that at least some of
the Cherokees killed wounded Iowans and scalped at least eight bodies. After the battle, an
adjutant of the Third Iowa Cavalry reported, “I also saw bodies of the same men [the 8 men
scalped] which had been wounded in parts not vital by bullets, and also pierced through the heart
and neck with knives,” evidence that “fully satisfied” the adjutant that his fellow Iowans had
been “brutally murdered.” Whatever brutality occurred, it ended when Federal artillery arrived
on the field and sent the Indians “hurriedly” retreating.95
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The incident at Pea Ridge sparked a testy exchange between the Union and Confederate
army commanders following the battle, which ended in Confederate defeat. The Union army
commander sent Gen. Van Dorn a terse message conveying his “regrets that we find on the
battlefield, contrary to civilized warfare, many of the Federal dead who were tomahawked,
scalped, and their bodies shamefully mangled.” The Union general expressed his hope the war
would not “degenerate to a savage warfare.” Confederate Gen. Van Dorn responded with an
accusation of his own. While Van Dorn noted that his Indian forces had for many years “been
regarded as civilized people,” he too wanted to repress “the horrors of this unnatural war.” Van
Dorn then went on to claim that Confederate prisoners had been murdered “in cold blood by their
captors, who were alleged to be Germans.”96
While Cherokee soldiers did scalp and kill wounded at Pea Ridge, it is telling that the
incident has grown in the legend and myth surrounding the battle. It is unsurprising that the
Cherokees acted as they did. Just several months before the Cherokees had participated in a
campaign where scalps were taken, prisoners beaten, and women and children driven destitute
along the frigid plains. In short, scalping and the killing of prisoners were hallmarks of the
western war that raged along the Confederate borderlands. The abuses of Pea Ridge were not the
first atrocities to happen, nor would they be the last. Yet because they happened to white
soldiers on a prominent battlefield, outrage ensued. It is ironic that while Union General Samuel
Curtis accused the Confederates of utilizing “savage” warfare via Indians, Union General David
Hunter was busy recruiting members of the same tribes for the Indian Home Guard a few
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hundred miles away. Enemy Indians were often “savage,” while friendly Indians were usually
“civilized.”
Following the defeat at Pea Ridge, the Confederate Indians returned home. General
Pike stationed them in Choctaw Nation in southern Indian Territory, hardly a place to stymy a
Federal invasion from Kansas. And an invasion was surely coming. Colonel William Weer, a
Kansan jayhawker and one known to imbibe, assembled an invasion force throughout the
summer of 1862. Under Weer’s direction, on June 28 the First Indian Expedition was underway
as nearly 6,000 Ohioans, Indianans, Wisconsinites, Kansans, and Indians marched south together
to retake Indian Territory for the Union.97
In some respects, the campaign was a disaster. The bulk of the enemy’s forces were far
to the south in Choctaw Nation; only Stand Watie’s Cherokees offered limited resistance. Small
skirmishes in early July at Spavinaw Creek and Locust Grove, Cherokee Nation helped boost
Union morale and drive Watie southward, but no decisive fight occurred. The expedition, with
no enemy to fight and no clear objective, listlessly continued southward. Meanwhile, the supply
line back to Fort Scott, Kansas, grew longer and longer.
Logistical problems and general incompetence plagued the whole operation. As the
expedition moved south, food and supplies grew scarce, and supplies from Kansas failed to
arrive. Advancing over one hundred miles into Indian Territory, the lack of water grew serious.
All that was available was “putrid, stinking water.” Luman Tenney, a trooper of the Second
Ohio Cavalry, wrote home, “The greatest trouble so far has been the scarcity of water…I feared
there would be a mutiny that day, so many boys hadn’t had water and weren’t permitted to leave
the ranks to get any.” Compounding the problem was the “violent southern sun,” which
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according to Tenney’s thermometer hit temperatures “as high as one hundred and twelve in the
shade.”98
Discipline and intoxication were problems, too. On the Fourth of July, Luman Tenney
penned sarcastically, “Great day. So many drunk. Officers gave the freest license to the men.
Both caroused. I was most disgusted.” In a letter home, he confided that “One officer even told
his men that the one who wasn’t drunk that night should be ducked in the Grand River…Col.
Weir, our commander, was so intoxicated that he could neither receive the report of battle or give
any orders.” On July 9th, Tenney complained, “March all the forenoon, and went only five miles
forward. So many blunders.” The general incompetence of many officers, but especially the
expedition’s commander William Weer, ensured the little was done to rectify the water scarcity,
the need for provisions, or the lack of communication from Kansas.99
On July 17, Colonel Weer ordered a council of war, which “decided that our only safety
lay in falling back to some point from which we could reopen communications with our
commissary depot.” Col. Weer ignored the council’s decision, and the next day he was arrested
by the expedition’s second-in-command Frederick Salomon, who promptly ordered the
expedition to begin retreating north. In his diary, Luman Tenney wrote of the arrest, “I never
saw so much excitement. All were glad.” Col. Salomon left the First and Second Indian Home
Guards to occupy that portion of the Cherokee Nation north of the Arkansas River. The First
Indian Expedition, a three week affair, was over.100
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Parched, hungry soldiers and William Weer’s career were, in reality, the least-harmed
victims of the Indian expedition. The expedition had been undertaken primarily to ease the
suffering of Indian refugees in Kansas and allow them to return home. Many had followed the
Union expedition southwards, only to watch most of the Union soldiers turn around and march
back north. Thousands more were preparing to return to the Territory, only to be advised to stay
in their refugee camps in Kansas. As many as 3,000 Indians accompanied the Union soldiers
who trudged back north in July; instead of alleviating the refugee situation, the failed expedition
aggravated it, adding to the total number of refugees in Kansas. Moreover, desertion among the
Indian Home Guard regiments skyrocketed as the U.S. army failed to liberate their homelands. 101
Although the expedition failed in its mission to retake Indian Territory and allow the
refugees to return home, the sudden presence of Union soldiers among the Five Tribes in the
summer of 1862 (their first appearance since withdrawing from the Territory in May, 1861) did
provide some important secondary accomplishments. A strong, if brief, Union military presence
induced many Cherokees to enlist in the Union ranks. Once again, John Drew’s regiment of
Confederate Cherokees, painstaking rebuilt after the Opothleyahola campaign, defected to the
Union side, nearly 600 men total. These defected Confederates formed the nucleus of the newly
formed Third Indian Home Guard regiment. 102
The most important defection to the Union cause, however, was no everyday Cherokee
warrior. From the expedition’s outset, Union leaders had hoped to sway Cherokee Chief John
Ross to the Union cause. “John Ross is undoubtedly with us, and will come out openly when we
reach there,” wrote Col. William Weer before the expedition began. “I am in receipt of
information that large bodies of Union Indians exist among all these people clear to Fort Cobb,
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and that they await our advance in order to take the field in behalf of the government.” On June
26, Weer communicated to Ross that his expedition would provide Ross and other Unionists
with “an opportunity to show their loyalty to the United States Government.”103
On July 7, Cherokee and pro-Confederate missionary Stephen Foreman paid a visit to
Chief John Ross to ascertain “if he should receive propositions from the Northern Government to
come under the old Treaties.” Ross apparently responded, “I do not know—one thing is clear,
we should have to submit to superior power.” The missionary was neither impressed nor
surprised by Ross’ answer, for Foreman suspected Ross of “trying to be a northern and southern
man both at the same time.” Stephen Foreman’s suspicions were soon validated.104
Just over a week later on July 15, Chief John Ross was arrested by Union forces,
immediately paroled, and accompanied Union forces away from his home in Park Hill. His
arrest saved him the embarrassment of betraying his treaty with the Confederacy. It was clear to
all, however, that John Ross and his followers (including Drew’s warriors) had abandoned a
Confederate cause they never placed much faith in and had defected to the Union side. John
Ross would spend the rest of the war in exile in Philadelphia. His followers, now allied with the
Union, would continue to fight the war in Indian Territory.105
The First Indian Expedition, weighed on the whole, represented a tremendous failure with
an equally tremendous silver-lining. The expedition failed to secure Indian Territory,
particularly the Cherokee and Creek Nations, for the Union. This failure resulted in many
refugees traveling southward needlessly, and ultimately thousands more Indian refugees pouring
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into Kansas. The Unionist Indians could not yet safely return home; those who did risked the
suffering that comes with a wartime no-man’s-land.
Yet the expedition, the first real show of Union military force, made permanent the
schism within the Cherokee Nation. From the very outset of the war, it was clear that a
Confederate alliance was never the desire of Chief John Ross or his followers. It was Ross’
followers, many of whom were Keetowah, who packed the ranks of John Drew’s Cherokee
regiment. It was Ross’ followers who subsequently abandoned the Confederacy and joined with
Opothleyahola at the Battle of Chusto-Talasah. It was Ross’ followers who again defected, this
time permanently, to the Union expedition in the summer of 1862. With the sudden appearance
of Union military forces in the vicinity, Unionist Cherokees, including Ross, could finally show
their true loyalty. As a result, the Confederate-Cherokee alliance lay in tatters.
The expedition also laid the groundwork for future offensives. Although most of the U.S.
forces had retreated, the Indian Home Guard regiments maintained footholds in Cherokee Nation
north of the Arkansas River. Furthermore, the expedition had managed to drive the Confederates
southward. Most of Cherokee Nation had become a no-man’s-land, where neither Confederates
nor Federals retained dominance. This vacuum of power would make the Federal invasion of
1863 easier.
The vacuum of power created by the 1862 First Indian Expedition also created the space
for banditry and guerrilla warfare. Although a second invasion in 1863 would bring a
conventional military campaign back into Indian Territory, from 1862 to 1865 most the Territory
remained a no-man’s land where violence ruled. The result was tremendous civilian suffering
and even more refugees, including Confederate Indians who sought refugees in north Texas.
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Stephen Foreman, who lived near Tahlequah in Cherokee Nation, recorded the constant
fear and violence that suffocated the Nation in 1862. “There is a stir here, or a scheme at work in
the dark that few can understand,” Foreman confided to his diary. “I feel as if a heavy dark
cloud hung over us.” Foreman was a “Watie man,” and often feared for his safety and that of his
family from the hands of pro-Union Pin Indians. “My present calculation,” Foreman declared on
July 4, 1862, “is to remain at home if the Feds do come, and attend to my ordinary duties. If
they take my life and destroy my property and houses, let all go together.”106
The missionary wrote constantly about the latest rumors of killings and theft. In
Foreman’s eyes, the Pins ruled the countryside. “And all who do not belong to their party, and
who have not fled to them for protection are robbed of everything…So to be a Watie man or an
anti-pin is to be under sentence of death.” One such Watie man was “Mr. Ursery, a white man
with a Cherokee family;” the Pins “cut him up alive, it is said.” At one point, Foreman heard
rumors of his brother’s death alongside another man. Although he doubted the veracity of the
rumor of his brother’s death, the other fellow—Abijah Hicks—was apparently truly dead. “He
was an inoffensive man,” Foreman wrote, “and if killed, it was either for his abolition sentiments
or his property, for no one who has a good horse or any property is safe.”107
On July 15, Stephen Foreman got a scare of his own. While sitting on his front porch
with his children, he was visited by “two Pins piloted by one of Chief Ross’ negroes.” Foreman
thought they “looked as if they were hunting something.” Ignoring Foreman’s inquiries, the
Indians ordered Foreman’s slaves to return with them to Union camps. Foreman “could neither
say nor do anything, knowing the whole place was surrounded by Pins.” Not long after their
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departure, one of Foreman’s slaves—Charles—“returned saying that he was sent after my
horse,” otherwise the Pin Indians would return. “It was hard to see my negroes taken off, and
hard still to see my own negroes take off my horses,” Foreman admitted. Still, Foreman let his
slaves and horses go, for he thought the whole affair was a trick. By resisting the Pins’ theft, he
suspected “that would give them a pretext to come for them and kill me.”108
That evening, one of his slaves returned to Foreman’s home to warn him that the
Unionists “were bound to kill me.” At his children’s pleas, Foreman spent the night in the
cornfield, unwilling to hide any farther from home for fear that “if my children were killed and
our houses and everything burnt up, I would be near and would go and suffer with them.”
Fortunately, no soldiers appeared to kill Foreman.109
Later in the war, fifteen year old James Barnes witnessed a murder in cold blood by
Confederate Choctaws. Visiting his uncle along the Arkansas-Territory border south of Fort
Smith, Barnes’ relatives were Unionists who spent their time “hiding in the timber and hills from
the Rebels.” One day, James was assigned to lookout for Confederates while the wanted men
enjoyed a proper meal at the dining table. When James “saw a string of Rebels” approaching, he
sounded the alarm and the men scampered. Everyone got away except for Jonathan Glenn, who
was captured. Apparently unsatisfied with their haul, the Rebels continued down to the house of
Flem Johnson. “Flem had the Pneumonia,” James recalled, “and was expected by everyone to
die. Rebels carried Flem out of his bed and set him against a tree and shot him to death.” As if
to compound the horrors James Barnes witnessed, a few days later after a local battle we
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watched a “Pin ‘Indian’ cut a patch of scalp about the size of the palm of their hand off the top of
the dead Rebel’s head.”110
Hannah Hicks—Abijah Hick’s widow—struggled through the war as well. The death of
her husband was far from her only misfortune. Her brother-in-law’s home was burned,
apparently for his pro-Confederate sentiments. She herself was robbed by Confederate soldiers
in November, 1862, many of whom she recognized as men whom had dined at her table. She
would endure four more robberies before the war ended. Hick’s experience sheds light on how
easily, and quickly, uniformed soldiers could turn into bandits, preying upon friend and foe
alike.111
Robberies and theft were common. Elizabeth Watts, a child during the war, remembered
Southern soldiers robbing her home during the war. The Rebels took all of the Watts’ food,
including the green onions in the yard. They cut the feather bed to pieces, letting “the feathers
fly in the wind.” “They simply stripped us of everything. Mother took her best dress and sat on
it to hide it. The made her get up and tore the dress into strings.” Elizabeth and her family took
refuge near Fort Gibson, where her father was a soldier and “we could draw on our rations like
the soldiers.” James Barnes and his family left the Territory in 1862 “on the account of Indian
raids taking all the stock and grain, even the blankets out of the house.” The family took shelter
in Missouri, and James’ father enlisted in the Union Army.112
Civil War Indian Territory fits nicely into the three-tiered world of Stephen Ash’s When
the Yankees Came. Ash argues that Federal invasions and subsequent occupations of Southern
territory “created in effect not one occupied South but three: the garrisoned towns…the
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Confederate frontier…and no-man’s land.” Union outposts at Fort Gibson, Tahlequah and
elsewhere provided some protection for Union refugees; likewise, the relative safety of Choctaw
and Chickasaw Nations and Texas offered some security for Confederate refugees. Yet much of
the borderlands—trapped between Union and Confederate zones of occupation—had also
become a no-man’s-land. Most of Cherokee, Creek, and Seminole Nations suffered from
lawlessness, where instead banditry, thievery, and violence ruled.113
Guerrilla warfare, raids, and banditry were not unique to Indian Territory, but instead
marred much of the Trans-Mississippi landscape. The violence in Indian Territory lends
additional evidence to the historical scholarship of Michael Fellman, Daniel Sutherland, and
Robert R. Mackey, all of whom document the rise and rule of guerrilla warfare that plagued
Arkansas and Missouri from 1862 to 1865. Indeed, the retreat of the First Indian Expedition and
the violent vacuum that ensued in the summer of 1862 coincides, as Daniel Sutherland has noted,
with “the high point of public confidence in guerrilla war,” which in turn “meant the end of
conciliatory policies toward southern civilians on the border.” In Arkansas, the failure of the Pea
Ridge campaign in early 1862 encouraged Confederate commanders to rely upon guerrilla
warfare. The resulting “Bands of Ten” order, which encouraged Southern patriots to form
independent companies of at least ten men to harass the invading Federals, led to wanton
banditry and destruction. In Arkansas, just as in Indian Territory, irregular forces and guerrillas
initiated “wholesale looting of Unionists, immigrants, and later loyal Confederates [which]
forced the population of Arkansas to flee to areas under military protection—Union or
Confederate.” Missouri was not exempt either; in fact, Michael Fellman declared the violence in
Missouri “the worst guerilla war in American history.” The violence and resulting refugees

113

Stephen V. Ash, When the Yankees Came: Conflict and Chaos in the Occupied South, 1861-1865
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995): 77.

78

blanketing Indian Territory were familiar scenes throughout the Trans-Mississippi region, and
the violence helped harden Federal attitudes towards the South.114
The war’s violence made most Indians refugees, and the numbers are simply astonishing.
By 1863-’64, some 14,000 Indians were refugees in Confederate held lands. Records from
March, 1865 indicate that some 17,100 Indian refugees were drawing rations from Union
military authorities in Union held lands. Even with possible overlap in the figures, it is apparent
that at least 30,000 Indians—60% of Indian Territory’s 1860 population—left their homes and
endured the hardships of refugee life during the war. This figure is even more astounding when
one considers that the usual figure cited for Confederate refugees total is 200,000. These
refugees were forced to rely on others—be it Union authorities, other Indian tribes, or white
neighbors—for sustenance. They suffered from disease, hunger, and lack of shelter. The Civil
War in Indian Territory uprooted most of the population and left them destitute and far from
home.115
The violence, suffering, and refugees that plagued Indian Territory throughout the Civil
War were byproducts of the failure of either side to permanently occupy the landscape. Even
with the appearance of Federal troops starting in 1862, most of Indian Territory lay outside the
purview of regular Federal or Confederate protection. This vacuum of authority and order
allowed banditry and violence to run unchecked, which in turn induced many Indians to leave
their homes to try and survive in safer, occupied regions.
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Conclusions
The war in the Confederate borderland owed its existence not to questions of slavery or
preservation of the Union, but instead to the mutually exclusive visions of sovereignty and future
that traditionalist and acculturated Indians carried. When the United States broke asunder in the
secession crisis of 1861, it created a political and military vacuum that allowed acculturated
Indians to bring their dream of Indian-Southern integration to fruition. For wealthy, elite
individuals like Stand Watie and Robert Jones, who envisioned themselves as both Indians and
Southerners, the prospect of a Confederate alliance glittered like gold. Receptive to the overtures
of alliance promulgated by Indian agents and white neighbors, and fearful of missionary and
Keetowah abolitionism, acculturated Indian elites led the Five Tribes to war on behalf of the
Confederacy.
Yet many Indians—perhaps even a majority of Indians—did not share the elite’s vision.
Traditionalist Indians sought instead to preserve the sovereignty and culture of their tribes within
the existing treaties of the United States. They often rejected the forms of acculturation—
plantation slavery, Christianity, contemporary dress, and more—that elite Indians affected, and
they did not see Indian and Southern interests as intertwined. Alliance with the South, in
traditionalist eyes, only offered war and devastation. The seemingly geopolitical impossibility of
neutrality forced the Five-Tribes to choose sides, and all five tribal governments allied with the
Confederacy. Yet traditionalist Indians found a way to voice their dissent. Gathering first under
the leadership of Opothleyahola, then in turn enlisting in the Union blue of Indian Home Guard
regiments, these Native-Americans sought to impose their own vision of sovereignty—one that
placed primacy on an Indian, not Southern culture and future—on Indian Territory.
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The winter 1861 Confederate offensive against brought the first taste of violence to the
Confederate borderland. White Southerners and acculturated Indians, brought together by
mutual wartime interests, waged a war against both Unionist warriors and civilians in an effort to
eliminate voices of anti-Confederate dissent in the Territory. The intent and brutality of the
campaign adds complexity to historians understanding of the war generally; in a political
backwater far from centers of power in Richmond and Washington D.C., the war took on harder
dimensions far earlier than historians have acknowledged. The resulting campaign pushed
Opothleyahola out of the country, but splintered the Cherokee-Confederate alliance and
catalyzed Union plans for invading—or perhaps liberating—Indian homelands in the Territory.
The 1862 Union invasion of Indian Territory was the final blow to the ConfederateIndian unity. The projection of Federal power into the Territory offered thousands of Indians a
real alternative to Confederate authority. Many Cherokees, including Chief John Ross, flocked
to the Union standard, and it was apparent that John Ross’ worst fears of intra-tribal warfare
would come true. The Cherokees, Creeks, and Seminoles now rocked in the throes of intra-tribal
civil war, and guerrillas and bandits ransacked the landscape. Scalping, murders, theft, and
destruction—these were hallmarks of the war in the borderlands that appear from the very
beginning. This brutality and violence adds even greater evidence to historians’ depictions of
guerrilla war in places like Arkansas and Missouri, suggesting that the Trans-Mississippi theater
experienced a more savage Civil War generally than those places east of the Mississippi River.
The war raged on in Indian Territory for another three years. In 1863, the Federal Second
Indian Expedition proved more successful than its predecessor, and at the Battle of Honey
Springs in July the Union decisively defeated Confederate forces and ensured their dominance in
the Territory. The subsequent two years brought an endless series of raids and skirmishes, and
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Indians on both sides served in campaigns outside the Territory’s borders, but no more major
campaigns in the Territory took place. Instead of battling the enemy, military authorities spent
most of their time grappling with the growing numbers of destitute refugees. Although the war
in Indian Territory began with a bang in 1861, it ended with a whimper in 1865. Brigadier
General Stand Watie—the only Native-American to achieve that rank during the Civil War—
surrendered his force on June 23, 1865, the last Confederate general to do so.116
It would be hard to underestimate the devastation reaped upon the Five Tribes during the
American Civil War. Although the figures will never be exact, it is estimated that one-third of
the Cherokee Nation, some 7,000 individuals, died during the Civil War. The Creeks lost nearly
a quarter of their population, roughly 2,500 individuals, during the conflict. The Choctaw,
Chickasaw, and Seminole Nations, which lay outside the Territory’s main warzone, escaped
similar death tolls, although undoubtedly many of members of these tribes died as well. These
numbers eclipse the casualty rates for either the North or the South; the deadliest war in
American history was even more lethal for Native Americans in their homeland.
Of course, surviving the conflict hardly meant life could return to the antebellum status
quo. Two-thirds of the Five Tribes, some 30,000 souls, were refugees by war’s end, and most
did not know if they had a home to return to in 1865. Families would never be the same; one in
four Cherokee children, for example, were orphans by war’s end. These numbers speak to the
intensity of the war on the Confederate borderland, and they speak to the immense suffering of a
people who were caught in a conflict not of their own making and in which many did not wish to
fight.117
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The war in the borderland suggests that there is still much to uncover about seemingly
well-worn topics within Civil War history. Despite its status as a near forgotten backwater, the
Civil War saga of Indian Territory sheds light on some of the Civil War’s greatest questions. In
the Confederate borderland, Indian debates over sovereignty and the future led to one of the most
violent, destructive, and forgotten chapters of the Civil War. Perhaps most importantly,
however, the story of Civil War Indian Territory deserves to be told simply because, for those
who lived it, this was the civil war. It was not epic, grand, or perhaps even militarily or
politically consequential. Yet from a human perspective, it merits our attention. The horrific
violence, destruction, and fear that stalked members of the Five Tribes and those who fought in
the Confederate borderland deserve our acknowledgement and remembrance.
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